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Foreword
This is the eighth of our series of reports that focus on pensions issues of direct
relevance to policymakers, financial advisers, and pension scheme members. 
The Conservative–Liberal-Democrat Coalition Government that came to power 
on 11 May 2010 announced that it was going to end the requirement for 
pension scheme members to purchase annuities by the age of 75. 
We felt that this proposal would have some serious unintended consequences 
and wrote to The Times on 27 May 2010:
Sir, The new Government has confirmed manifesto promises to remove the 
requirement that individuals use their pension fund to buy an annuity at retirement. 
Such a policy would be popular, easy to implement and generate much needed tax 
revenues. However, we have grave concerns that this will have serious consequences 
for the security of pensioners’ retirement incomes and the public finances.
Without an annuity, retired people risk outliving their resources and also bear the 
responsibility of managing their financial assets. If things go wrong, they will surely 
turn to the taxpayer for help. The Conservatives propose a minimum annuity 
purchase, so pensioners never become eligible for means-tested benefits. We suspect 
that estimating such a minimum will be difficult, since benefits are calculated 
according to individual circumstances and these circumstances, together with the level 
of state support, are likely to change considerably over the next 30 years.
The proposal could lead to significant changes in the nation’s savings decisions and 
tax payments. It could also encourage members of occupational pension plans - 
including those in the public sector - to access their entire fund as a lump sum rather 
than receive it as income. This would turn the current steady decline in defined 
benefit pension plans into a rout, as pension fund sponsors - and that would include 
the Government - had to find cash immediately, instead of gradually over a long 
period into the future.
We suggest that the seriousness of the unintended consequences of their pension 
policy is fully recognised and that the policy proposal is re-examined.
Professor David Blake, Director, Pensions Institute, Cass Business School
Dr Edmund Cannon, University of Bristol 
Professor Ian Tonks, University of Exeter
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/letters/article7137165.ece
Following publication of the letter, we were approached by the Prudential and 
invited to prepare two reports that expanded on the ideas that were contained in 
the letter. 
. Previous reports are listed at the end of this document.
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The first of these reports ‘Ending compulsory annuitisation: What are the 
consequences?’ published in July 2010 was designed to stimulate the debate 
about the proposal to end the mandatory requirement to purchase annuities 
in pension schemes as formally announced in the Budget Statement on 22 
June 2010 and subsequently expanded upon in the HM Treasury consultation 
document ‘Removing the requirement to annuitise by age 75’ released on 15 
July 2010. 
This second report ‘Ending compulsory annuitisation: Quantifying the 
consequences’ is intended to provide a quantitative assessment of the issues 
raised in the first report. We also provide policy recommendations in relation to 
this proposal.
This research was sponsored by the Prudential and we are extremely grateful 
for their support. The Prudential has not sought to influence the conclusions 
of the report and they may not share or endorse the views expressed here. 
Furthermore, the Prudential have not imposed any conditions or requirements 
on the contents of the report.
We should also stress that the views in the report are those of the authors 
and not necessarily those of the Pensions Institute, which itself takes no policy 
position.
David Blake, Edmund Cannon and Ian Tonks
September 2010
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Executive summary
. The Government intends to end the requirement for defined contribution 
pension scheme members to annuitise their pension fund by the age of 75. This 
report provides a quantitative analysis of some of the key consequences of this 
policy.
2. We have calculated the level at which the Minimum Income Requirement 
would need to be set to have a minimal effect on demand for Pension Credit. 
We suggest that the total pension would need to be initially around £14,100 for 
an individual (including the BSP) and around £20,000 for a couple (including 
the BSP), rising in line with inflation. Further calculations which take account of 
uncertainty about wages and prices suggest that these levels are conservative 
and that there is a high probability that pensioners who annuitise to these 
levels will still receive significant amounts of benefits. We have not attempted to 
evaluate whether the total pension figures shown would meet people’s actual 
expenditure needs throughout retirement. Given the complexity of the state 
benefit system and the variability in people’s personal circumstances, we are 
unable to quantify the impact on demand for other means-tested benefits. 
3. We estimate that 28 per cent of retiring pensioners with private pension 
savings would have sufficient pension wealth to secure a MIR at the levels 
outlined above. We also estimate that the minimum cost of the Pension Credit 
alone that these pensioners might eventually be able to claim is £83 million per 
annum (a total of £1.7 billion in present value terms when we add up across all 
future years).  This figure does not include the cost arising from other means-
tested benefits that we have been unable to quantify. It is crucially important for 
policymakers to recognise that these cost estimates are highly sensitive to the 
assumptions chosen, and that there is therefore a considerable risk to the public 
finances in setting the MIR too low. Using different but still plausible actuarial 
assumptions, for example, would double the cost of Pension Credit estimated 
above. So although this figure is uncertain, it is likely to be an under-estimate.
4. If the requirement to annuitise at age 75 above the MIR is abolished, and if 
instead individuals access flexible drawdown, we estimate that the compulsory 
purchase annuities market will shrink from its current value of £11 billion per 
annum to around £9 billion per annum. Further, the value of DC pension funds 
that could be accessed as a lump sum or drawdown product would be between 
£1 billion and £2 billion per annum.
5. We suggest that the proposal to abolish the annuitisation requirement for DC 
pension schemes will have an effect on the DB pensions market, either through 
DB members demanding similar rights under their scheme or through pension 
transfers. We suggest that if the same rules on annuitisation above a Minimum 
Income Requirement in the DC market are applied to the DB market, between 
£10.2 billion and £16.7 billion of DB pension fund assets may be accessed each 
year by the retiring cohort. We suggest that if the Government does not intend 
its proposals on the relaxation of annuity rules for DC pensions to apply to DB 
pensions, it will need to legislate to prevent this.
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6. We argue that the proposal to abolish the annuitisation requirement will have 
an effect on the government bond market. If the retiring cohort of pensioners 
access their DC lump sums, we predict insurance companies will no longer need 
to hold government bonds in the same quantity to back their annuity products 
and would become net sellers of between £0.5 billion and £1.2 billion of gilts 
annually. Similarly if DB pensioners also access the lump sum equivalent of their 
pensions at retirement, DB pension funds will liquidate between £3.2 billion 
and £5.2 billion of long-term government debt annually. This liquidation of 
government debt will occur at a time when the Government is attempting to fund 
a huge budget deficit by issuing bonds.
 
7. Allowing pensioners to avoid annuitisation will make it possible for pension 
fund wealth to be used to escape inheritance tax. The consultation proposes a 
55 per cent recovery charge. Since this merely cancels the tax relief on pension 
contributions of a higher rate taxpayer, such a charge may be insufficient to 
prevent higher-rate tax payers using pension wealth for inheritance tax planning 
which may result in a loss of tax revenues. However, the 55 per cent recovery 
charge would be penal for basic rate taxpayers. Differential treatment in this way 
may be perceived as unfair and result in political pressure for further changes.
8. Optimal decumulation investment strategies can be highly complex and 
need to take into account anticipated investment returns, attitude to risk, life 
expectancy, health status and the desire to make bequests. Further, the optimal 
strategies are not static and involve complex choices about, say, the optimal 
timing of annuity purchases. However, these strategies typically fail to take into 
account the cognitive problems that elderly people can face when dealing with 
investments. The proposed change to the pensions annuity market represents 
a shift from a “consumption frame” to an “investment frame”. We also report 
that, whether as a result of cognitive impairment or an inappropriate framing of 
choices, many older adults will find it difficult to make sensible decisions about 
how to invest and spend their retirement savings. The Government could find 
itself embroiled in another mis-selling scandal and this time involving vulnerable 
elderly people.
9. The Government’s proposals are likely to lead to an increase in the variability 
of outcomes for pensioners. As a consequence of this: (i) there is the risk of 
increasing long-term political pressure from the retired population for a larger 
share of the national cake and (ii) there is the risk of increased poverty among 
pensioners who make poor decisions with their wealth. 
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. Introduction
The Conservative–Liberal-Democrat Coalition Government that came to power 
on 11 May 2010 announced that it intended to end the requirement for defined 
contribution pension scheme members to purchase annuities by the age of 75. 
This was formally confirmed in the Budget Statement of 22 June 2010. The 
Finance Bill 2010 of 1 July announced that the minimum age for annuitisation 
would be raised to 77 years as a transitional measure to defer compulsory 
annuitisation while further consultation on rule changes takes place. On 15 
July 2010, HM Treasury published a consultation document, ‘Removing the 
requirement to annuitise by age 75’, which outlined the Government’s proposals. 
The consultation paper emphasises that the tax treatment of pension savings 
should continue to follow the “exempt-exempt-taxed” (EET) model, but suggests 
three important changes: (i) there will be no requirement to annuitise DC 
pension funds at age 75, and instead individuals can either choose to access 
their pension funds through capped drawdown (similar to the current unsecured 
pension or USP) or access their funds as a lump sum through flexible drawdown; 
(ii) in the case of flexible drawdown, the intention is to establish a minimum 
required annuitisation level, based on a Minimum Income Requirement (MIR); 
and (iii) the introduction of a tax relief recovery charge on capital withdrawals 
at death to recover the value of the tax relief made available during the 
accumulation phase of the pension scheme.
In an earlier report ‘Ending compulsory annuitisation: What are the 
consequences?’ published in July 2010, we attempted to identify some of the 
issues and consequences of the Government’s decision to end compulsory 
annuitisation. We argued that these consequences fell into two categories, those 
that affect individuals and those that affect the wider society in terms of claims 
on the public purse.
It is difficult for rational, well-informed individuals to run down retirement assets 
at the appropriate rate: spending too quickly results in exhausting assets and 
lower welfare in later retirement, while spending too slowly results in under-
consumption and leaving unintended bequests. The advantage of an annuity 
is that it overcomes both of these problems. The advantages are even larger 
for individuals who have low levels of financial literacy, poor understanding of 
longevity risk or are less than completely rational, since an annuity protects them 
from making serious mistakes. It also prevents them from gaming the system to 
increase entitlement to means-tested benefits.
The consequences of the policy change for taxpayers could be equally 
devastating. Not only could there be a huge increase in claims for means-tested 
benefits, there could also be demand from defined benefit scheme members, 
including public sector workers in unfunded schemes, to have their pension as a 
lump sum rather than as an income. There will also be new opportunities to use 
the pension system to create tax loopholes and there is likely to be a fall in the 
demand for long-term government bonds which will occur at precisely the time 
the Government is issuing debt to plug the hole in the Government finances. 
To mitigate these problems, the Government is proposing a minimum level of 
annuitisation in order to satisfy a MIR, with the minimum set at a sufficiently high 
level that pensioners could never fall back upon means-tested benefits. While 
this goes some way to dealing with the consequences listed above, we highlight 
a number of problems with determining what the minimum level should be, chief 
among these being the wide differences in individual circumstances. 
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Existing pensions policy is premised on tax exemptions being given to pension 
funds in exchange for those funds being used to generate a life-long pension 
income: compulsory annuitisation was the quid pro quo for tax relief. It is worth 
asking why the policy should be changed now. Willetts (2010) has observed 
that the baby boomer generation seems to have benefited at the expense of 
both previous and younger generations. We know that previous generations 
accepted compulsory annuitisation. The pension prospects of future generations 
look increasingly bleak: younger generations tend to have very little pension 
savings and many are likely to have to annuitise all of their pension funds under 
the MIR. This might result in a curious outcome, namely that the relaxation of 
the compulsory annuitisation requirement will only really benefit the current 
generation coming up to retirement (and then only a small subset of that 
generation). This might be perceived as generationally unfair. Further, there is 
a risk that many people will substitute income for capital and will be less likely 
to spend that capital to meet day-to-day expenses. This will lead to further 
demands for state support in areas such as health care, long-term care and 
winter fuel payments. The reforms may also result in a greater disparity of 
outcomes as a result of poor investment choices or excessive expenditure. This 
would lead to further demands for state support in addition to any demand for 
support from existing means-tested benefits.  
One possible answer to the issue of intergenerational fairness is that by allowing 
individuals to avoid annuitisation they are able to pass on more wealth to their 
heirs. In fact, the consultation document makes it clear that “the Government 
does not intend pensions to become a vehicle for the accumulation of capital 
sums for the purposes of inheritance” (¶2.2). But even if the policy did allow 
more wealth to be passed to the future generation by inheritance, only the 
relatively rich would benefit and this would contribute to the UK’s twin problems 
of increasing inequality and falling social mobility, precisely one of the points 
that Willetts sees as an intergenerational problem.
The importance of this point is difficult to quantify and for the rest of this follow-
up report, we concentrate on quantifying the more strictly economic effects 
of the policy of removing the annuitisation requirement. In particular, we will 
address the following issues, providing quantitative assessments where possible:
(i) determining the likely size of the Minimum Income Requirement (Section 2); 
(ii)  estimating the numbers of pensioners expected to satisfy the MIR and the 
value of the  
means-tested benefits they might eventually claim (Section 3); 
(iii) quantifying the impact on annuity markets (Section 4); 
(iv) quantifying the impact of the proposal on DB schemes (Section 5); 
(v)  quantifying the impact of the proposal on the long-term government bond 
markets (Section 6); 
(vi)  examining the cognitive problems that elderly people can face when dealing 
with investments (Section 7); 
(vii)  considering the effect of the 55 per cent recovery charge on future savings 
decisions and inheritance (Section 8);
Based on our analysis in the previous sections, Section 9 provides our responses 
to the questions raised in the consultation document
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2. Calculating the Minimum Income Requirement
Chapter 3 of the HM Treasury consultation document considers the Minimum 
Income Requirement (MIR). The primary purpose of the MIR is to ensure that a 
pensioner does not “exhaust their pension savings prematurely and subsequently 
fall back on the state” (¶ 3.2). Given the complexity of the state benefit system, 
it is impossible to devise a MIR which completely precludes pensioners receiving 
means-tested benefits and the consultation document recognises this by stating 
that the MIR must be a “reasonable proxy” which ensures that the “probability of 
falling back on the state is minimal” (¶ 3.12).
A further complication is that calculation of the MIR is dependent upon the future 
path of inflation and earnings. Based on projections of these variables over the 
next 35 years, we first calculate the MIR that ensures a pensioner would receive 
no Pension Credit or Guarantee Credit before the age of 100. We then consider 
a more sophisticated approach which quantifies the uncertainty surrounding 
projections so far into the future and use this to calculate an alternative MIR.
Benefits such as Housing Benefit and Attendance Allowance are dependent on 
tenancy and health status, respectively. The interaction of these benefits with 
other benefits, pension income and wealth is complicated and we ignore them 
in this analysis. However, the impact of these benefits along with Council Tax 
Benefit and long-term care support are potentially significant.
2.1 The MIR based on fixed projections of future inflation and earnings
Pensioners who have made a full set of National Insurance contributions 
throughout their working life will receive the full Basic State Pension (BSP), which 
is currently £97.65 per week for individuals and £156.15 per week for couples 
(respectively, £5,077.80 and £8,119.80 per year). However, Guarantee Credit 
ensures that the minimum income actually received is £132.60 for individuals 
and £202.40 for couples (£6,895.20 and £10,524.80 annually) and Pension 
Credit ensures that they receive benefits if their pension income is less than 
£9,620 and £14,130, respectively. 
The June 2010 Budget announced a “triple guarantee” that BSP and entitlement 
levels would rise at the minimum of average earnings, 2.5 per cent or inflation 
(measured using the CPI). We show the history of these variables since 1964 in 
Figure 2.1, together with the RPI measure of inflation as the CPI is not available 
before 1988. Nominal wages have grown faster than prices in every year of the 
period 1993-2009 except 2009, when both wage growth and inflation were less 
than 2.5 per cent and 2007-8 when RPI was above wage growth. The average 
rate at which pensions would have grown over this period were the new policy to 
have been in place since 1964 is almost exactly 4 per cent per year.
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Figure 2.: Wage growth and price inflation
Assuming this 4 per cent growth in pensions continues into the future, we 
illustrate what might happen to the BSP and the entitlement limits in Figure 2.2 
for the next 35 years (i.e., for the case of a pensioner currently aged 65 until 
they are 100). The solid black line shows what might happen to the BSP over 
the period; the dotted line shows the minimum income assured by Guarantee 
Credit; and the dashed line shows the maximum level of total pension income 
that a pensioner can have without receiving any Pension Credit. 
Figure 2.2 Evolution of pension benefits
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We now consider what would happen to a pensioner’s private pension. For the 
purposes of this analysis, we mean this to include the sum of any occupational 
or personal pensions that an individual has and, in addition, include any 
SERPS or S2P.2 The consultation document suggests (¶ 3.8, ¶ 3.9) that the MIR 
would include the caveat that the income would grow in line with Limited Price 
Indexation (LPI). LPI is defined as the lower of 2.5 percent and CPI-based 
inflation. From the data in Figure 2.1, the CPI-based measure of inflation 
has averaged 2 per cent over the period 1993-2009 and we assume that the 
pension grows at the same rate going forward.
Because the triple guarantee means that state pension entitlements can never 
grow by less than 2.5 per cent and since LPI means that private pensions 
need not grow by more than 2.5 per cent, it is inevitable that state pension 
entitlements will grow faster than any LPI-linked secured income source used to 
meet the MIR. Figure 2.2 illustrates this for two hypothetical pensioners. In both 
cases, we assume that they have no income other than their pension (i.e., they 
have no earnings and their total non-pension savings are less than £10,000). 
 
Pensioner 1 has a relatively small pension fund and purchases an LPI-linked 
annuity starting at £2,600 per year (£50 per week). Together with the BSP, this 
means that his total pension income is £7,678: the growth of total BSP and 
private pension income is illustrated by the red line. Given his low pension 
income, he receives both Guarantee Credit and Pension Credit. Over time, his 
income rises less rapidly that the growth rate in these two means-tested benefits 
and, by about 2029, it is less than the minimum guaranteed. His means-tested 
benefits become gradually more generous over time (growing at an average of 
5.5 per cent per year).
Pensioner 2 has a larger pension fund and is able to purchase an LPI-linked 
annuity starting at £5,720 per year (£110 per week); combined with the BSP, this 
makes a total of £10,798 per year (illustrated by the blue line). This means that 
his pension income is sufficiently high that he is not initially eligible for means-
tested benefits. Because Pensioner 2’s pension grows more slowly than the state 
entitlement cut-offs, he will become eligible for Pension Credit by 2022.
 
The key issue here is that the cut-offs for means-tested benefits will typically 
grow at the rate of (nominal) earnings and this will nearly always be higher than 
the rate of growth for a pension indexed by LPI.3 We may establish the MIR with 
reference to the pension income streams in Figure 2.2. We need to identify a 
total pension income stream that intersects the maximum total income that just 
receives Pension Credit (the dashed line in Figure 2.2), for a pensioner aged 
100 in 2045. This intersection establishes that such a pensioner would just fall 
into the entitlement to Pension Credit. We then track this level of pension income 
back to 2010. 
2 The State Second Pension is based on two factors: (i) the number of years that an individual has paid NI contributions while not 
contracted out into an occupational pension (i.e., they are alternatives not complements); (ii) a measure of career average income (where 
salaries earned in earlier years are adjusted for inflation to make them comparable in real terms). Such pensions have only been in 
existence since 1978 when the policy was introduced as the State Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS): significant changes were 
made in 2002 when the scheme was renamed the State Second Pension Scheme. This means that the maximum number of qualifying 
years earned so far is 32. Since the pension is 20 per cent of the career average income (which is itself limited by a cap) the maximum 
S2P is only about £3000. In the data sources we use below it is difficult to separate the S2P from the BSP. Any SERPS or S2P will contribute 
to the MIR automatically, since it rises in line with inflation.
3 One solution to this problem would be that pensions had to grow in line with wages to meet the MIR. Such annuity products are 
currently unavailable and it is difficult to see how life insurers could provide them in the absence of earnings-linked bonds (currently only 
RPI-linked bonds are available). We do not consider this possibility further.
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Under the assumptions we have made so far about earnings and the LPI, we 
estimate 
• the MIR for a 65-year old individual in 2010 would be £14,100.
This figure is inclusive of the BSP and so requires a minimum annuitisation of 
£9,000 per year (£173 per week) on top of the BSP. The MIR will ensure that he 
is ineligible for Pension Credit before the age of 100. The probability of a 65-
year old man living to be more than 100 is currently projected to be 8 per cent. 
It might be argued that to pay means-tested benefits to 8 per cent of the 
population is a sufficiently small cost that it would satisfy the condition in the 
consultation document that the costs be minimal. However, the probability of a 65-
year old woman living to 100 is currently projected to be 26 per cent: there is an 
8 per cent probability that the woman could live to 107. To ensure that only 8 per 
cent of women received means-tested benefits, it would be necessary to have an 
annuity whose initial payment was £10,300, 14 per cent higher than for a man. 
So far we have been talking in terms of individual pensioners. But most 
pensioners at retirement, are in couples and for them the BSP and the 
entitlement cut-offs are different. Using similar analysis to the above, we 
estimate that 
•  the MIR for a couple should be £20,000 including the married couple’s state 
pension. 
We suggest that a couple would have to buy a joint annuity initially paying 
£11,900, but which would revert to £9,000 (the same as for an individual) upon 
the death of the first partner.
2.2 The MIR based on stochastic projections of future inflation and earnings
All of our analysis so far ignores the random nature of earnings and prices 
and the resulting uncertainty in predicting the future paths of pensions. As 
Figure 2.1 makes clear, wage and price inflation has in certain years been both 
considerably higher and considerably lower than the 4 per cent average we 
have used for the fixed projections. 
We now extend our analysis by projecting the future paths of inflation, earnings 
and pensions assuming the same level of variability in inflation and earnings 
that was observed in the period 1993-2009: this period can be considered to be 
one of reasonable price stability. 
Based on these data, we estimated a simple econometric model of real wages 
and the CPI and use it to simulate possible growth paths for nominal wages and 
inflation. This allows us to calculate the pension payments that would be made 
for each growth path.4 
4 The technical details are as follows: we modelled real wages rather than nominal wages since nominal wages are so highly correlated 
with inflation. The model was a two-lag vector autoregression (VAR) model which included real wage growth, CPI inflation and RPI 
inflation (for comparison purposes of RPI-linked pensions). The use of two lags was based upon the finding that the second lag was 
significant in all regressions. The model implicitly makes identifying assumptions that real wages and prices are I(1) but are not 
cointegrated. Projections were based on the parameter estimates from the VAR (treated as certain) with Monte Carlo disturbances drawn 
from a multivariate Normal distribution whose covariance matrix was taken directly from the VAR estimation. All the programming was 
done in OX.
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Our results are illustrated in the form of a blue fanchart in Figure 2.3 for 
Pensioner 1 from the example above. Recall that Pensioner 1’s initial private 
pension income is £2,600 and grows by LPI. The black line in the middle is the 
central estimate (i.e., the median) and successively lighter shades of blue reflect 
lower probabilities.5
Fig 2.3: Simulations of the distribution of means-tested benefits for Pensioner 
The bright red line at the lower end of the fan chart is the line taken from Figure 
2.2 which assumed complete certainty. Note that almost the entire fan chart lies 
above this line. The reason for this is that the effect of uncertainty is a one-way 
bet: LPI means that the private pension nearly always increases by less than 
2.5 per cent (bounded below by zero), whereas the state benefit cut-offs nearly 
always increases by more than 2.5 per cent and can increase by quite a lot more.
Given the upsided nature of the risk to means-tested benefit levels when inflation 
uncertainty is taken into account, this suggests that the MIR should be set at 
a considerably higher level than that indicated in the model above assuming 
fixed future inflation. Our criterion then was to set the MIR to ensure that no 
benefits would be received before age 100. When we account for risk, we 
need a different criterion, so instead we look at the expected present value of 
means-tested benefits that an individual pensioner will receive if they buy an LPI-
indexed annuity. Our results are shown in the second column of Table 2.1.
5 Each successive change in colour is the boundary of a 5-percentile range (on some computers it may be difficult to distinguish all of the 
colours)
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Table 2.: Means-tested benefits payable to 65-year-old pensioners with 
different starting pensions
The figures in the first column arise from putting weekly amounts on to an annual basis (i.e. they 
are multiples of 52).
Table 2.1 shows that the expected present value of all means-tested benefits to 
Pensioner 1 is £26,222, given his initial pension of £2,600. This might seem a 
relatively small sum compared with the potentially large sums that could be paid 
out in future years as shown in Figure 2.3. But Figure 2.3 takes no account of the 
fact that payments made a long way in the future need to be discounted heavily 
and that the probability of making those payments is also small because the 
further ahead these payments are due, the less likely the pensioner is to be alive 
to receive them. So although Figure 2.3 shows the median means-tested benefit 
payable to Pensioner 1 in 2045 (when he will be 100) to be over £10,000, the 
probability of Pensioner 1 being alive then is about 8 per cent and the effect of 
discounting £1 paid in 2045 to today’s values reduces it to about 24 pence. So 
the expected present value of the possible £10,000 payment in 2045 is about 
£192. 
Starting LPI-linked pension 
payment (£ per year)
Expected present value  
of Pension Credit
Male using “Lives”  
(PML92, sc)
Males using “Amounts” 
(PMA92, sc)
Females using “Amounts” 
(PFA92, sc)
520 39,146 48,129 61,398
1,560 32,684 40,783 52,937
2,600 26,222 33,437 44,475
3,640 19,760 26,092 36,013
4,680 13,298 18,746 27,552
5,720 8,240 12,819 20,520
6,760 5,184 8,955 15,606
7,800 3,335 6,389 12,077
8,840 2,201 4,648 9,479
9,880 1,501 3,455 7,543
10,920 1,054 2,618 6,074
11,960 761 2,019 4,945
13,000 562 1,581 4,065
14,040 425 1,257 3,371
15,080 327 1,010 2,816
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Given this, Table 2.1 provides a method for setting the MIR, once the maximum 
acceptable level of means-tested benefits has been decided. Suppose £1,000 
per year would be acceptable for example: then the MIR for a single male 
should be set at about £16,000 per year, including BSP.
This is a relatively high level of pension and anyone receiving such a high 
pension is likely to have a much higher life expectancy than a typical pensioner. 
We therefore re-calculated the net present value of Pension Credit using 
“Amounts” rather than “Lives” tables and report our results in column 3 of 
Table 2.1. We calculate the corresponding figures for women and these are in 
column 4.6 This results in much higher figures. Although we do not use these in 
our analysis below, their intention is to show that our estimates are likely to be 
conservative and the costs to the tax payer may eventually be much higher.
2.3 The MIR and employment income
The consultation document makes it clear that the MIR must be in payment if 
the pensioner is to be allowed to access the rest of their pension fund and is 
confined to pension income (¶3.6 and ¶3.7): earnings and non-pension
investment income are excluded. This is clearly correct since a pensioner will 
eventually choose or be forced to stop work and there is therefore no guarantee 
that they will continue to meet the MIR once employment ceases. 
Many pensioners receive income from employment and this number is likely 
to increase with the removal of the default retirement age, the raising of the 
state pension age and the need for people with insufficient pension savings to 
continue to work.
It is difficult to see how a simple policy could be framed that allowed a 
pensioner to use earned income to meet the MIR in the short run without then 
creating a significant risk that they will fall back on means-tested benefits when 
employment ceased. For this reason, we support the proposal that the full MIR 
should be secured upon accessing the pension fund, regardless of employment 
income.
2.4 Means-tested benefits in the short run
Current pension policy allows pensioners to purchase a level annuity (i.e., one 
that is not indexed to any measure of inflation). For a given purchase price, 
these provide a much higher level of starting income. Were policy to make it 
compulsory to purchase a LPI-indexed annuity, it would result in many personal 
pensioners having a lower retirement income initially, although since it will be 
growing they will have a higher income in the future than if they had bought a 
level annuity.
A consequence of this would be that relatively poor pensioners are likely to 
receive more means-tested benefits upon annuitising, because they will have a 
6. The “Lives” tables calculate the simple average mortality across all private pensioners. The “Amounts” tables weight by size of pension, 
so that richer (and therefore more longer-lived) pensioners have a disproportionate effect on life expectancy. Details can be found in 
Cannon and Tonks (2008).
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lower income than they would have had if they had purchased a level annuity. 
This may be compensated for by them having lower means-tested benefits in the 
future. This effect will be amplified over time with the shift towards DC pensions 
meaning that the long-term impact on demand for means-tested benefits (and 
therefore the potential interaction with the MIR) will be greater.
The total effect on means-tested benefits, measured by the expected net present 
value, is likely to be roughly neutral, but means-tested benefits will certainly rise 
in the short run. We have not attempted to quantify this because of the difficulty 
in finding information on proportions of pensioners with different types of 
indexing arrangements.
Summary
We have calculated the level at which the Minimum Income Requirement would 
need to be set to have a minimal effect on demand for Pension Credit. We 
suggest that the total pension would need to be initially around £14,100 for 
an individual (including the BSP) and around £20,000 for a couple (including 
the BSP), rising in line with inflation. Further calculations which take account of 
uncertainty about wages and prices suggest that these levels are conservative 
and that there is a high probability that pensioners who annuitise to these 
levels will still receive significant amounts of benefits. We have not attempted to 
evaluate whether the total pension figures shown would meet people’s actual 
expenditure needs throughout retirement. Given the complexity of the state 
benefit system and the variability in people’s personal circumstances we are 
unable to quantify the impact on demand for other means-tested benefits.
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3. Numbers of pensioners expected to satisfy the MIR  
and the value of the means-tested benefits they might  
eventually claim
In this section, we estimate the number of pensioners likely to satisfy the MIR and 
the likely cost of means-tested benefits that will be payable if the MIR is set at the 
levels suggested in Section 2.
The mean average annual private pension income for recently retired pensioners 
who have a private pension is £3,536 for individuals and £9,568 for couples. 
From the data sources available, we are unable to separate the distribution of 
the recently retired from all pensioners or to separate couples from individuals. 
Nevertheless, it is clear from Figure 3.1 that the distribution of private pension 
income is very highly skewed to the right. In numerical terms, the median 
pension is only 61 per cent of the mean.
Figure 3.: Distribution of total private pension income (weekly income)
Source: DWP(2010) Pensioners’ Income Series 
It is also clear from this figure that most pensioners have less than our estimates 
of the annual MIRs of £14,100 and £20,000, for individuals and couples, 
respectively.7 
Because of the deficiencies of Figure 3.1, we combine the information in this 
figure with that in DWP (2010, Tables 2.3, 2.4 and 3.9). This suggests that the 
mean of the distribution of pensioner income is £168 per week and that the 
means of recently retired pensioner couples and individuals are £184 and £68, 
respectively. We use these figures to make simple mean shifts to the distribution 
in Figure 3.1 and then calculate the resulting proportions of these distributions.
7 These figures are calculated from the weekly averages for occupational and personal pension income in Table 2.3 of DWP (2010). 
These figures under-estimate the total pension figure that we need since they do not include pension income from SERPS/S2P which is 
aggregated with the BSP in the Table.
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There are likely to be compositional effects in the distribution, which this 
assumption ignores, and this should be borne in mind when interpreting the 
subsequent calculations. A summary of our results is shown in Table 3.1.
Table 3.: Estimates of the number of pensioners affected and the cost of 
means-tested benefits
To illustrate, there are approximately 120,000 single male pensioners, of whom 
54 per cent have a private pension. From our estimate of the distribution of 
pensions for single males, we estimate that 17 per cent of those with a pension 
would not receive Pension Credit if they annuitised all of their pension wealth, 
but by annuitising less (just sufficient to meet the MIR) they will receive some 
Pension Credit. We perform the same calculations for female individuals and 
also for couples. The total proportion of all retiring individuals who have pension 
savings (so a couple counts twice) affected is 28 per cent.
We now do a further calculation to estimate the costs. We assume that 
individuals remain as individuals, but recognise that couples are likely to become 
individuals as one partner dies (we ignore family creation and divorce, etc). We 
construct a simple actuarial model to work out the time path of the number of 
survivors from couples where one member dies.8
From actuarial tables, we can forecast the expected number of individuals, 
couples or survivors still alive at any point in the future. Using the model of 
inflation and earnings described in Section 2.2, we generate a series of tables 
analogous to Table 2.1 for males, females, couples and survivors using the 
appropriate amounts from the distribution as starting values and sum across 
the distribution. So, for example, the increase in the expected present value 
of Pension Credit to male individuals is £10.8 million per annual cohort that 
retires. This sum may sound rather small, but consider the following: many male 
individuals would have received means-tested benefits anyway; some individuals 
die before receiving any means-tested benefits; those who do receive means-
tested benefits tend to receive them a long way into the future and so the present 
value is small.
Number of 
Pensioners 
(000)
Proportion 
with private 
pension (%)
Proportion 
with income in 
excess of MIR 
(%)
Total expected NPV of  
means-tested benefits (£million)
Male individual 120 54 17 £10.8m
Female individual 68 54 5 £2.8m
Couples 248 75 32 £3.6m
Survivors* £66.2m
Total 28 £83.4m
Note: * derived from an actuarial model and the initial number of couples
8. This is based on actuarial tables PM/FL92 short cohort and assumes independence of deaths. All of the calculations in this section are 
based on “Lives” mortality.
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The figure is even smaller for female individuals, mainly because female 
individuals have such small pensions to start with that they are likely to receive 
means-tested benefits regardless of the new policy. The group which is most 
likely to receive Pension Credit despite having the MIR is couples, although by 
the time that they receive the money one of the members of the couple is likely to 
have died and so only the survivor will benefit.
Summing across the different groups we see that the total cost for a single year’s 
retirees is about £83 million. The total cost of the policy is the cost of all future 
years’ retirees summed together (and appropriately discounted). However, the 
distribution and level of private pensions is likely to vary considerably between 
cohorts. Given data limitations, we have not attempted to calculate this directly, 
but instead use an annuity factor of twenty to obtain a total cost in the region of 
£1.7 billion.9  
However, we believe this figure to be an under-estimate for two reasons. First, 
we have omitted some of the means-tested benefits that pensioners would 
receive (Attendance Allowance, etc). This is necessary due to limitations on data 
that are too restrictive for us to perform reliable calculations: as detailed in our 
first report, the rules for receiving such benefits are complicated and depend 
upon both income and wealth. Furthermore, historical data would only be of 
limited help, since some of the benefit rules changed in the June 2010 Budget. 
Secondly, we have calculated the expected present value of benefits based 
on mortality which is appropriate for the whole population, but those who 
escape the annuitisation requirement are likely to be longer lived than normal. 
Comparison of the Lives and Amounts calculations in Table 2.1 suggests 
that using Amounts data would lead to twice as large an increase in cost as 
suggested. 
Summary
We estimate that 28 per cent of retiring pensioners with private pension savings 
would have sufficient pension wealth to secure a MIR at the levels described 
above. We also estimate that the minimum cost of the Pension Credit alone that 
these pensioners might eventually be able to claim is £83 million per annum 
(a total of £1.7 billion in present value terms when we add up across all future 
years). This figure does not include the cost arising from other means-tested 
benefits that we have been unable to quantify. It is crucially important for 
policymakers to recognise that these cost estimates are highly sensitive to the 
assumptions chosen, and that there is therefore a considerable risk to the public 
finances in setting the MIR too low. Using different but still plausible actuarial 
assumptions, for example, would double the cost of Pension Credit estimated 
above. So although this figure is uncertain, it is likely to be an under-estimate.
 9. This is the same annuity factor as the Government uses to convert DB pension amounts into present value terms to check that the 
Lifetime Allowance is not violated.
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4. The impact of the proposal on the UK annuity market
In 2009, according to figures from the ABI, the UK’s new pension annuity market 
(i.e., sales of new policies) consisted of 465,000 policies with a value of £11 
billion, so that the average policy value is around £23,655. We will examine the 
effect of the proposal to remove compulsory annuitisation of DC schemes on 
this market, taking into account that those individuals below the MIR will still be 
required to purchase an annuity. 
The DWP’s Pensioners’ Income Series gives details of pensioners’ incomes 
based on information collected in the Family Resources Survey (FRS). This 
survey provides a breakdown of pensioner income from the state pension, other 
benefits, investment income, earnings occupational and personal pensions. 
Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of pensioners’ incomes from personal pensions 
for those in receipt of it. In 2008-09, the mean personal pension income for the 
recently retired was £97 per week (£5,044 p.a.). 
Figure 4.: Distribution of annual income (£p.a.) from personal pensions in 
2008-09 of “recently retired”
Source: DWP (2010) Pensioners’ Income Series
Relaxing the requirement to annuitise affects those individuals above the MIR 
and to examine the effect of the proposal on the UK annuity market we take 
the pensioners’ incomes from personal pensions above the MIR, for those 
pensioners who are retiring each year, and convert into an annuity value using 
the following formula:
 Annuity value = No. pensioners x Annuity income x Capitalisation factor
To estimate this annuity value, we need to know the number of persons retiring 
each year, along with their ages and gender; the personal pension income 
received by these groups; and a capitalisation factor that converts pension 
payments into a lump sum equivalent value. We discuss each component of this 
calculation in turn.
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Number of pensioners
The DWP (2010) Pensioners’ Income Series gives details of the number of 
“recently retired pensioner units” (about 2,000,000 units with 1,100,00 
couples and 900,000 singles) in 2008-09, where “recently retired” is defined 
as pensioner units where the head is less than 5 years over state pension age, 
namely, single women between 60 and 64, single men between 65 and 69, and 
pensioner couples where the head is between 65 and 69 if male, or between 
60 and 64 if female. Therefore, to obtain an estimate of the number retiring 
each year, we need to take a proportion of these figures, allowing for the fact 
that these five-year aggregates will include a disproportionate number of those 
pensioner units who have retired in the first year, and a disproportionate number 
of single females. We allow for these effects in Table 4.1.
Table 4.: Numbers of retiring persons per year 
Sources: DWP (2010) Pensioners’ Income Series, and own calculations
The last column is obtained from the proportion of recently retired pensioner 
couples and single units receiving a personal pension given in the Pensioners’ 
Income Series as 25 percent and 13 percent respectively.
Pensioners’ incomes
The Pensioners’ Income Series breaks down the income received from personal 
pension schemes, by recent retirees, and into couples and singles, and by 
gender. In Table 4.2, we report the mean and median amounts of personal 
pensions received by type of pensioner household.
Table 4.2: Average amount of personal pension income of recently retired 
for those in receipt of personal pensions in 2008-09
Source: DWP (2010) Pensioners’ Income Series, Table 3.7, and gender split from Table 2.6
We can combine the distribution of personal pension income from Figure 
4.1 with the average amounts received by each household type to obtain a 
distribution of personal pensions by household type, under the assumption that 
the entire distribution is shifted up or down to match the average pension for 
that type. There are likely to be compositional effects in the distribution, which 
this assumption ignores, and this should be borne in mind when interpreting the 
subsequent calculations.
Mean personal pension (£) Median personal pension (£)
Per week Per year Per week Per year
Married couples 109 5,668 48 2,496
Single males 145 7,549 69 3,605
Single females 45 2,323 21 1,109
Numbers Numbers receiving personal pension
Married couples 248,534 62,134
Single males 67,503 8,775
Single females 119,856 15,581
Total number of retiring units in 2010 435,892 86,490
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Capitalisation factor
All that remains is to apply a capitalisation factor to obtain the value of these 
personal pensions. We use standard actuarial methods to compute the present 
value of a £1 annual annuity income, by age and gender, assuming survival 
probabilities of each group taken from the Continuous Mortality Investigation 
(2002) life office pensioner tables PMA92 and PFA92 with the short and long 
cohort corrections.0 
Table 4.3:  
Capitalisation factors for a pension of £ per annum payable for life
Source: CMI (2002) life office pensioner tables PMA92 and PFA92
The retiring cohort of pensioner units is made up of couples and singles, and 
we assume that couples purchase a joint life annuity, with the annuity payment 
reduced to 60 per cent on the death of the male. We assume couples consist of 
a 65-year old male married to a 63-year old female (based on an assumption 
of a 2.4 year difference in the ages of the couple). Single women pensioners 
are assumed to be aged 60, and singles male pensioners are assumed to be 
aged 65. 
Survival probabilities
 Short cohort Long cohort
Panel A: Single annuity for 65-year-old male
Level 13.6 14.4
Escalating at 2.5% 17.6 19.1
Real 19.2 21.1
Panel B: Single annuity for 60-year-old female
Level 16.3 16.9
Escalating at 2.5% 22.6 24
Real 25.3 27.1
Panel C: Joint annuity for 65-year old male, reverting to 60% for 63-year old female on 
death of male
Level 15.4 16.2
Escalating at 2.5% 20.7 22.5
Real 23 25.1
10 Further details of such calculations can be found in Cannon and Tonks (2008)
11. Social Trends (2010), pp 19-20
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Annuity values for the retiring cohort
We now combine the information in Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 to produce 
estimates of the annuity values implied by the personal pension incomes that 
are accessed by the retiring cohort. We first estimate the implied annuity values 
without making allowance for the MIR, i.e., by assuming that the present value of 
all personal pension income could be accessed at retirement. 
This would be the situation if all of the retiring cohort with DC pensions accessed 
the capped drawdown option as explained in the consultation paper (¶ 2.14).
Table 4.4: Estimated present values of personal pensions for annual retiring 
cohort before applying the MIR
Source: Own calculations based on Pensioners’ Income Series
According to Gunawardena et al (2008), 87 per cent of annuity products sold, 
are level annuities, and for this reason we use the capitalisation factor in Table 
4.3 for level annuities. The final two columns of Tables 4.4 provide estimates 
of the value of annuities on the basis that the products sold are level annuities. 
These estimates suggests that depending on the assumptions made about 
survival probabilities (short and long cohort projections), the total present value 
of personal pension income is between £6.9 billion and £7.3 billion. 
However, as previously mentioned, the ABI estimate of the size of the pensions 
annuity market in 2009 is £11 billion, so, using our approach, we appear to 
have under estimated the size of this market. This under-estimation may be due 
to a number of factors: (i) although the modal age for annuity purchase is age 
65, many people access their personal pension income before this date, which 
would increase the value of their annuities; (ii) some of the pension annuity 
market will represent annuitisation of occupational DC pensions, which are not 
included in the Pensioners’ Income Series personal pension income figures; (iii) 
some of the annuities purchased are escalating or real annuities, and as Table 
4.3 shows, this would involve a higher capitalisation factor; (iv) we have already 
mentioned that there will be compositional effects in the distribution of the data 
on personal pensions, in particular single females are likely to form a greater 
percentage of the lower incomes; and (v) there may be errors in the reporting of 
pension incomes.
The consultation paper suggests that only funds above those necessary to 
sustain a MIR may be accessed under flexible drawdown, and provided that  
the recipient has annuitized up to the MIR in an escalating annuity (¶ 2.15,  
¶ 3.3, ¶ 3.9). Our earlier calculations have suggested that the MIR for a single 
Numbers receiving 
personal pensions
Mean pension 
(£ per annum)
Total present value of 
personal pensions (£ million)
Capitalisation factor assumption Level/Short Real/Long
Married couples 62,134 5,668 5,423 5,705
Single males 8,775 7,549 901 954
Single females 15,581 2,323 590 612
Total value 6,914 7,271
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person might be £14,100 (including the BSP of £5,077.80), meaning that only 
individuals receiving above approximately £9,000 per annum from a DC 
pension may access flexible drawdown, and then only having first annuitised 
their funds to receive an inflation-protected pension of £9,000 per annum. 
Similarly, for a couple, the MIR will be at least £20,000 per annum (again 
including the married couples’ BSP of £8,119.80), meaning that only couples 
receiving above £11,900 from a DC pension and having annuitised to receive 
this pension may access flexible drawdown. We may apply a cut-off at the MIR 
to the distribution of personal pension income, as illustrated in Figure 4.1, to 
estimate the annuity value of personal pension income above the MIR, under 
the assumption that these individuals are only in receipt of personal pension 
income in addition to the BSP In other words, they are not receiving any other 
additional pension income (either occupational or SERPS/S2P). To the extent 
that individuals are receiving other secure sources of life-long pension income, 
this would enable greater amounts of personal pension income to be accessed 
under flexible drawdown. Table 4.5 shows the size of the annuity market that 
could be accessed at retirement above the MIR.
Table 4.5: Estimated annuity values of personal pensions for annual retiring 
cohort above the MIR
Own calculations based on Pensioners’ Income Series 
The numbers in Table 4.5 are calculated on the basis that individuals whose 
personal pension income is above the MIR are required to purchase an 
escalating annuity (using the relevant capitalisation factors from Table 4.3) up 
to the MIR. The estimates in Table 4.5 indicate that the total value of personal 
pension income above the MIR is between £1.3 billion and £1.35 billion. This is 
around 19 per cent of the total annuity market that was estimated in Table 4.4. 
We believe that our estimates in Table 4.4 under-estimate the size of the annuity 
market as reported by the ABI. Applying a scaling adjustment to our estimates, 
we predict that abolishing the requirement to annuitise DC pension funds above 
the MIR, will cause the remaining compulsory purchase pensions annuity market 
to shrink from its current size of £11 billion to around £9 billion, and that the 
value of DC pension funds that could be accessed as a flexible drawdown 
product would be between £1 and £2 billion per annum.
Numbers receiving 
personal pensions 
above MIR
Mean pension 
above MIR 
(£ per annum)
Total present value for 
personal pensions above MIR 
(£ million)
Capitalisation factor assumption Level/Short Level/Long
Married couples 7,767 13,200 1,078 1,067
Single males 2,325 14,711 266 271
Single females 1,402 2,909 11 0
Total value 1,354 1,339
Total value after scaling adjustment 2,155 2,025
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As an additional check on these calculations, we can also use the ABI figures 
on the distribution of pension annuities sold by fund size as illustrated in Figure 
4.2. We will assume that individuals have no more than one policy, although in 
practice, it is possible for individuals to have more than one policy. The Figure 
then shows the number of individuals buying annuities for various fund sizes. 
Figure 4.2: Distribution of pension annuities sold in 2009 by size of fund
Source: ABI Annuity Sales Data
We may calculate the implied fund size necessary to satisfy the MIR, under 
alternative assumptions about the capitalisation factor, and, in particular, 
whether the annuity providers are using the long or short cohort corrections in 
Table 4.3.
Table 4.6: Additional estimated values of personal pension funds of annual 
retiring cohort
Own calculations based on ABI Annuity Sales Data
Panel A MIR (above BSP) Fund size necessary 
to satisfy MIR (£ million)
Capitalisation factor Level/Short Level/Long
Married couple £11,800 181,720 191,160
Single male £9,000 122,400 129,600
Single females £9,000 146,700 152,100
Panel B
Numbers receiving 
personal pension above 
MIR
Total present value for personal 
pensions above MIR (£ million)
Capitalisation factor Level/Short Level/Long
Married couples 3,242 493 465
Single males 1,707 207 195
Single females 2,152 302 290
Total value 1,001 949
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In Panel A of Table 4.6, we compute the minimum fund size necessary to satisfy 
the MIR for couples and single males and females, where we make the previous 
assumptions on the ages of the retiring cohort. We can see that the implied 
fund size varies depending on the relevant group from £122,400 for single 
65-year-old males using the short-cohort correction to a fund size of £191,160 
for a married couple. In panel B, we apply these minimum fund sizes to the 
distribution of funds in Figure 4.2, to obtain the potential fund sizes that could 
be released if these individuals accessed flexible drawdown. We assume that 
the distribution of these fund sizes across the type of pensioner unit is given 
by the ratios in Table 4.1 which again may lead to compositional errors in our 
calculations. The estimates in Table 4.6 suggest that the pension annuity market 
will shrink by between £949 million and £1 billion. 
These estimates are smaller than our estimates in Tables 4.5. The two sets 
of estimates have been computed under different approaches: the first takes 
data on the distribution of pensioner incomes and imputes fund values (Table 
4.5); the second takes the existing fund values of annuity policies and makes 
assumptions about the distribution of pensioner types. We suggest that using 
both approaches provides an upper and lower bound on the likely effect of the 
flexible drawdown option on the existing pensions annuity market. 
Finally, we note some caveats on the effects of the policy change on the annuity 
market. Our estimates have assumed that individuals who are able to access 
the flexible drawdown market will do so. This is an extreme assumption to 
illustrate the magnitude of the potential effects. In fact, many individuals with 
large pension funds who could choose an unsecured pension, actually choose 
to annuitise and they do so between the ages of 60-65. Such individuals clearly 
have a demand for the hedging properties of annuities, and it is possible that 
even if they were able to access flexible drawdown, they would still choose to 
annuitise. In addition, some individuals are currently accessing USP, and it is 
possible that if these individuals were able to access flexible drawdown, they 
would be willing to annuitise up to the MIR in order to access their funds above 
the MIR. This would actually represent a boost to the current annuity market.
Summary
If the requirement to annuitise at age 75 above the MIR is abolished, and, if 
instead, individuals access flexible drawdown, we estimate that the compulsory 
purchase annuities market will shrink from its current value of £11 billion per 
annum to around £9 billion per annum. Further, the value of DC pension funds 
that could be accessed as a lump sum or drawdown product would be between 
£1 billion and £2 billion per annum.
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5. The impact of the proposal on defined benefit schemes 
Abolishing the compulsory annuitisation requirement for DC schemes is likely 
to have implications for both occupational DB and DC schemes. The Impact 
Assessment in the consultation document mentions the impact of the proposed 
change on occupational DB and DC pension schemes and ¶ 20 suggests that 
relatively few occupational schemes will make the required rule change in the 
short term. We question this view. 
The Government Green Paper (DWP, 2002) carried the message that the 
complexity of the previous pensions regime hindered an individual’s ability 
to make sensible savings decisions. A key proposal (subsequently enacted on 
A-day in April 2006) was to simplify the pensions taxation system with a move 
to a new system based on a Lifetime Allowance. According to HM Treasury/
Inland Revenue (2002), a guiding principle in simplifying the tax rules for 
pensions included “consistency: to give people confidence that everyone has 
equivalent rights and opportunities” (¶ 3.5) and “By eliminating the complexity 
of multiple sets of overlapping rules, people will be freed to make clear and 
confident decisions about savings for retirement without the need for expensive 
advice. In the new single, unified regime there will be no need to distinguish 
between defined benefit and defined contribution schemes, allowing savers and 
employers sponsoring schemes to make arrangements for pensions to suit their 
career patterns and the needs of the labour market.” (¶ 3.6)
The implementation of the Lifetime Allowance by HMRC has meant that both 
DB and DC pensions are deemed to have an underlying fund value. In the case 
of a DC scheme, this is explicit; for DB schemes, it is implicit. For tax purposes, 
the two types of occupational pensions are treated the same. Assuming that the 
desire for equality of treatment between DB and DC schemes continues, then 
abolishing the compulsory annuitisation requirement for DC schemes should 
also apply to DB schemes. In fact, the transfer rights of members of DB schemes 
would also imply that an individual member of a DB scheme has the right to 
transfer into a DC scheme.2 FSA (2010) provides advice on the risks associated 
with pension transfers. Under current rules, there has been little point in DB 
scheme members switching to a DC scheme, since it would still be compulsory 
to annuitise 75 per cent of the pension fund by age 75. Given transactions 
costs and the fact that the pension wealth transferred may be calculated at 
unfavourable actuarial rates for all except those with health problems, the 
benefit to following this strategy has only been used by a small minority of 
people in particular circumstances.
Removing the annuitisation requirement could change the situation dramatically. 
Currently, there is a puzzle as to why individuals in a DB scheme seem content 
to convert their implicit pension fund into a regular pension income, whereas 
many individuals whose savings are in a DC scheme are reluctant to annuitise.3 
12 Pension transfers are seen as necessary for ensuring an efficient labour market (Becker, 1964) although the Government is currently 
consulting on proposals that would abolish transfers between contracted-out DB and DC schemes and is seeking an amendment to 
the Occupational Pension Schemes (Contracting-out) Regulations 1996 and The Contracting-Out (Transfer and Transfer Payments) 
Regulations 1996.
13 Selection effects might explain these preferences, since individuals who choose to join a DC scheme may have different characteristics 
from individuals who opt for a DB scheme.
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One reason relates to behavioural psychology and suggests that the annual 
reporting of the size of the DC pension fund, rather than the amount of pension 
that the fund will generate, plays a role in this puzzle. With annual pension 
statements in DB schemes now showing the cash value of DB pensions (in order 
for individuals to be informed that they are within their Lifetime Allowance), the 
removal of the need to annuitise, when combined with the presentation of a 
cash value for accrued benefits, may have significant behavioural consequences. 
In simple terms, it may lead DB members to prefer taking the fund rather than 
the pension. Further, financial advisors may have an incentive to contact retiring 
members of DB schemes, pointing out that they are now able to access their 
pension fund values. We will now provide estimates of the potential quantum 
here. We wish to emphasise that this is a potential unintended consequence 
of the proposal to relax the annuitisation requirement, but the Government 
may need to legislate to prevent DB scheme members also accessing flexible 
drawdown.
Table 5.1 shows the numbers of active, deferred and pensioner members of 
occupational pension schemes. There are a total of 27 million members of 
occupational pension schemes, split roughly equally between active members, 
deferred members and pensioners. Of the 9 million active members, 5.4 million 
are in the public sector and 3.6 million in the private sector.
Table 5.: Number of members of occupational pension schemes in 2008
Source: Occupational Pension Schemes Survey (2009, Table 2.1)
Table 5.2 shows the 9 million active members divided across DC and DB 
schemes, and by size of the firm sponsoring the scheme, in terms of number of 
employees: 7.2 million active members are in occupational schemes in which 
the sponsoring firm employs more than 10,000 employees, illustrating that 
occupational pension schemes are typically arranged by large employers.
Type of member Numbers (millions)
Active members 9.0
Private sector 3.6
Public sector 5.4
Pensions in payment 8.8
Private sector 5.0
Public sector 3.9
Deferred pension entitlements 9.9
Private sector 6.7
Public sector 3.2
Total 27.7
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Table 5.2: Number of active members of occupational pension schemes in 
2008, by size, sector and benefit structure (millions)
Source: OPSS (2009, Table 2.6)
Public sector workers are covered by a variety of occupational pension schemes 
which are implicitly or explicitly underwritten by the Government. Table 5.3 
shows the number of active members in the major public sector pension 
schemes
Table 5.3: Major public sector pension schemes
Source: Pensions Commission (2004) Table 3.2; and Audit Commission (2010) Figure 1
All of the private sector schemes in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 are funded, although it is 
only the Local Government Pension Scheme in the public sector that is funded. 
If compulsory annuitisation of DC pension schemes is abolished, there is a 
real possibility that a large number of public service workers from both funded 
and unfunded schemes would also demand their pension as a lump sum and 
thereby dramatically bring forward payments from the Government. In the 
case of unfunded public sector schemes, effectively off-balance sheet public 
pension liabilities would be brought onto the balance sheet immediately, since 
the Government would have to issue additional bonds to make these pension 
payments. 
Size of unit Private sector Public  DB Total DB Total
DB DC Total
10,000+ 1.6 0.4 2.0 5.2 6.8 7.2
1,000-9,999 0.7 0.4 2.4 5.3 7.1 7.7
100-999 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.4
<100 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
Total 2.6 1.0 3.6 5.4 8.0 9.0
Funding status Sectors
Numbers of active 
members (millions). 
Source: Pensions 
Commission (2004)
Numbers of active 
members (millions). 
Source: Audit 
Commission (200)
Unfunded
Civil Service, armed 
forces, police, fire
1.04 0.98
Notionally 
funded
NHS, teachers 2.02 2
Funded Local government 1.5 1.65
Funded quasi-
public sector
Universities 0.1 0.1
Total 4.66 4.73
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A similar problem would also be felt by private sector pension funds which 
would be faced with raising additional funds to finance pension lump sums or 
would have to sell financial assets to make the cash payments. 
Combining Tables 5.3 and 5.1 suggests that around 6.65 million employees are 
members of a funded pension scheme. Table 5.4, taken from UBS (2010), shows 
the estimated value of pension fund assets in self-administered DB and DC 
schemes, insurance company administered pension schemes, and also personal 
pension schemes for comparison at the end of 2009.4 The reported values are 
market values and hence will fluctuate as the value of equity and bond markets 
fluctuate.
Table 5.4: Market value of total assets in UK pension funds at end 2009
Source: UBS Pension Fund Indicators (2010)
The Table shows that the total value of assets held by UK occupational pension 
schemes at the end of 2009 was £1,320 billion. If compulsory annuitisation is 
abolished, the 6.65 million active members of pension schemes would be able 
to access their share of these funds at retirement. 
In a funded pension scheme, an individual and their employer make regular 
contributions and these compound at the fund’s rate of return. At retirement, the 
accumulated funds are used to pay the pension of the members. Assume that 
annual contributions are £1, starting when the member is age 25 and continue 
for 40 years. The member retires at 65, is expected to live until age 85, and 
draws down the fund to zero by this age. We suppose that the annual return on 
pension fund assets is equal to the long-term government bond rate of 4.2 per 
cent.5 Figure 5.1 shows the percentage of the total fund value that has accrued 
by each age between 25 and 85. 
	
Type of pension scheme £ billions
Occupational self-administered DB 805
Occupational self-administered DC 270
Insurance company administered 245
Total occupational schemes 1,320
Personal pension schemes 305
Total all pension assets 1,625
14 More detailed information on these fund values can be obtained from the ONS publication MQ5 (2010) on investments by pension 
funds, insurance companies and trusts.
15 Bank of England yield curves, available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/Statistics/yieldcurve/index.htm
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Figure 5.: Percent of pension fund total value credited to each annual cohort 
Source: Own calculations
Unsurprisingly, this percentage is maximised at age 65, which means that the 
cohort that is retiring can access 3.87 per cent of the total fund value. Applying 
these calculations to the self-administered pension funds in Table 5.3 suggests 
that the retiring cohort will be able to access £31 billion of DB and £10 billion 
of occupational DC accumulated pension funds each year. This provides our 
initial estimates of the amount of money that can be accessed under flexible 
drawdown (before taking into account the MIR) and if flexible drawdown is 
applied to occupational pensions. We should note that some of these DC 
pension assets are annuitised in the pension annuity market and have already 
been accounted for in Section 4.  
In order to provide a more sophisticated computation of the impact of DB 
pensioners accessing flexible drawdown, while still allowing for a threshold 
above the MIR, we will follow the same approach taken in Section 3 and 
estimate implicit pension fund values based on current occupational pension 
income data. To obtain an estimate of the value of DB pension funds for the 
annual cohort of retiring pensioners, we again use the formula:
 Value of fund = No. pensioners x DB pension income x Capitalisation factor
As in Section 4, to estimate this value, we need to know the number of persons 
retiring each year, their occupational pension income and an appropriate 
capitalisation factor. We discuss each component of this calculation in turn.
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Number of pensioners
As a robustness check on our previous estimates, in addition to the Pensioners’ 
Income Series, we will also use ONS population estimates, so that we have two 
sets of estimates for the number of new pensioners each year. 
The population estimates give the numbers of males and females for each age 
cohort for the entire UK population. We take the number of males retiring from 
the number of male 65-year-olds and split this group into couples and singles, 
based on the population estimates by marital status. Again, we assume that 65-
year-old males are married to 63-year-old females, and the percentage of single 
women retiring (at an assumed age of 60) is then computed from the data in the 
Pensioners’ Income Series as 27.5 per cent of retiring units.
Table 5.5: Numbers of retiring persons per year: Two sets of estimates 
Sources: ONS Population Estimates (2009); ONS Mid-2008 Marital Status Estimates; DWP (2010) 
Pensioners’ Income Series, and own calculations
The proportion of recently retired pensioner couples and individuals receiving an 
occupational pension are given in the Pensioners’ Income Series as 62 percent 
and 47 percent, respectively, and these definitions of occupational pension 
income includes both DB and DC pension income.
Pensioners’ incomes
The Pensioners’ Income Series gives estimates of the distribution of DB and 
occupational DC pension income. The mean for all pensioner units is £168 per 
week (£8,736 p.a.), while, for the recently retired, it is £206 per week (£10,715 
p.a.). The distribution of occupational pension income, for those pensioners in 
receipt of it, is given in Figure 5.2.
Panel A: From ONS population estimates Numbers Numbers receiving occupational pension
In 2010, number of males aged 65 retiring 312,720
Of which: Married couples (aged 65/63) 245,926 152,474
         Single males (aged 65) 66,794 31,393
Single females (aged 60) (27.5% of total) 118,598 55,741
Total number of retiring units in 2010 431,318  
Panel B: From Pensioners’ Income Series Numbers Numbers receiving occupational pension
Married couples 248,534 154,091
Single males 67,503 31,726
Single females 119,856 56,332
Total number of retiring units in 2010 435,892
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Figure 5.2 Distribution of annual income (£p.a.) from occupational pensions in 
2008-09 of “recently retired”
Source: DWP (2010) Pensioners’ Income Series
The Pensioners’ Income Series further breaks down the income received from 
occupational pension schemes, by recent retirees, by couples and singles, 
and by gender. In Table 5.6, we report the mean and median amounts of 
occupational pensions received by type of pensioner household.
Table 5.6: Average amount of occupational pension income of recently 
retired for those in receipt in 2008-09
Source: Pensioners’ Income Series, Table 3.7, and gender split from Table 2.6
We combine the distribution of occupational pension income from Figure 5.2  
with the average amounts received by each household type to obtain a 
distribution of each occupational pension by household type, under the 
assumption that the entire distribution is shifted up or down to match the  
average pension for that type. 
Mean occupational pension (£) Median occupational pension (£)
Per week Per year Per week Per year
Married couples 255 13,260 158 8,216
Single males 171 8,907 93 4,833
Single females 114 5,938 62 3,222
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Capitalisation factor
We use the capitalisation factors in Table 4.3 to obtain the value of DB pensions. 
Pension fund values for retiring cohort
We combine the information in Tables 5.5, 5.6 and 4.3 to produce estimates of 
the value of the occupational pension fund that could be accessed by the retiring 
cohort. Table 5.7 suggests that depending on the assumptions made about 
survival probabilities and the type of pension received, the estimated total value 
of pension funds imputed to the retiring cohort varies between £40.3 billion and 
£66.1 billion. 
Table 5.7: Estimated values of occupational pension funds of annual retiring 
cohorts before applying the MIR
Source: Own calculations
These estimates in the row labelled “Total value” represent the value of funds 
attributable to the annual retiring cohort across all occupational pension assets, 
estimated as £1,320 billion in Table 5.4. As we have already mentioned, some 
of these DC pension funds are annuitised in the pension annuity market, and 
we need to be careful of double counting these estimates. The numbers in Table 
5.4 suggest DB schemes represents 61% of all occupational pension fund assets, 
and so in Table 5.7, we estimate the value of occupational DB pension funds 
attributable to the retiring cohort as between £24.6 billion and £40.4 billion.
We now repeat these calculations to estimate the value of pension funds above 
that necessary to sustain an MIR, which we estimate at £14,100 pa for a single 
person, and £20,000 pa for a couple. Table 5.8 shows the estimated value of 
occupational DB pension funds that could potentially be accessed at retirement 
above the MIR.
Numbers receiving 
occupational 
pension
Mean 
pension (£ 
per annum)
Total present value of 
pension funds
(£ million)
Panel A: From ONS population estimates
Capitalisation factor assumption Level/Short Real/Long
Married couples 152,474 13,260 31,136 50,747
Single males 31,393 8,907 3,803 5,900
Single females 55,741 5,938 5,395 8,970
Total value 40,334 65,618
Value of occupational DB 24,604 40,027
Panel B: From Pensioners’ Income series
Married couples 154,091 13,260 31,466 51,286
Single males 31,726 8,907 3,843 5,963
Single females 56,332 5,938 5,453 9,065
Total value 40,762 66,314
Value of occupational DB 24,865 40,451
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Table 5.8: Estimated values of occupational DB pension funds of annual 
retiring cohorts with pensions above the MIR
Source: Own calculations
These calculations assume that those individuals above the MIR still take an 
occupational DB pension up to the MIR. In the subsequent calculations, we will 
use two sets of figures from Table 5.8 to assess the impact of retiring pensioners 
accessing the values of their pension funds above the MIR. At the lower end, 
under the assumption of level future pensions and with life expectancy given by 
the short cohort projections, we estimate the value DB pension funds that can be 
accessed at £10.2 billion. At the upper end, under the assumption of real index-
linked pensions and assuming the long cohort projections for life expectancy, the 
value of DB pension funds that can be accessed is estimated at £16.8 billion. 
Using the numbers of active members in different types of pension schemes 
from Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, we can allocate the estimated values in Table 5.8 
across these schemes. 
Numbers 
receiving 
occupational 
pension above 
MIR
Mean 
pension 
above MIR
 (£ per 
annum)
Total present value of pension 
funds (£ million)
Panel A: From ONS population estimates
Capitalisation factor assumption Level/Short Real/Long
Married couples 59,922 14,892 13,742 22,398
Single males 11,019 10,212 1,530 2,374
Single females 12,207 7,344 1,461 2,429
Total value 16,734 27,202
Value of occupational DB 10,208 16,593
Panel B: From Pensioners’ Income Series
Married couples 60,558 14,892 13,888 22,636
Single males 11,136 10,212 1,547 2,400
Single females 12,337 7,344 1,477 2,455
Total value 16,911 27,490
Value of occupational DB 10,316 16,769
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Table 5.9: Estimated size of DB occupational pension fund liabilities of the 
retiring cohort with pensions above the MIR, across types of scheme
Source: Own calculations.  
Note we do not include private sector occupational DC schemes in this table.
The figures in the final two columns of Table 5.9 show how the pension liabilities 
estimated in Table 5.8 are divided across the different types of DB pension 
scheme: private sector DB, public sector funded and public sector unfunded. We 
will now consider the impact of these fund value calculations on: private sector 
funded schemes, public sector funded schemes, and public sector unfunded 
schemes.
Impact of change in compulsory annuitisation on private sector funded schemes
We estimate that between £3.3 billion and £5.5 billion of pension liabilities 
in private sector DB schemes could be accessed by the annual retiring cohort. 
Since October 2008, the value of transfers from defined benefit schemes have 
to be calculated in accordance with the Occupational Pension Schemes (Transfer 
Values) (Amendment) Regulations 2008. The cash equivalent transfer value 
(CETV) should broadly equal what it would cost a scheme to provide a leaving 
member’s benefits (both accrued and discretionary) plus the value of any options 
the member has. The trustees can choose whether or not to include discretionary 
benefits. Options might include the right to commute part of the pension for a 
cash lump sum, the right to a higher spouse’s benefit in exchange for a lower 
member’s benefit, and the right to draw the pension before the scheme’s normal 
retirement age (NRA). The scheme actuary, who will calculate the CETV, is 
entitled to take into account the likelihood of these options being exercised.
 
The Regulations require certain economic, financial and demographic 
assumptions to be made in order to calculate the CETV. These will be based 
on the actual scheme membership, but can be adjusted in the light of external 
information. The scheme’s investment strategy will also influence the size of the 
CETV. Other things equal, a higher equity weighting in the scheme will lower the 
CETV, since a smaller initial investment is needed to achieve a target fund size 
when investment returns are assumed to be higher (as they are with equities in 
comparison with bonds, for example). Finally, the trustees can reduce the CETV 
in proportion to the size of any scheme deficit. However, they must do this on the 
basis of an Insufficiency Report prepared by the scheme actuary.
Type of Scheme No. active 
members 
(millions)
Percentage of 
Total
Value of 
pension 
liabilities 
(level/short: £ 
million)
Value of 
pension 
liabilities 
(real/long: 
£ million)
Private funded DB 2.6 33% 3,317 5,450
Public funded (LGPS) 1.65 21% 2,105 3,459
Public unfunded 3.8 47% 4,785 7,861
Total 8 100% 10,208 16,769
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In order to assess the impact of allowing members of private DB schemes to 
access the value of their pension fund at retirement, we will use information on 
funding from the Purple Book, published jointly by the Pension Protection Fund 
and The Pensions Regulator. It is estimated that there is a universe of 7,400 PPF-
eligible DB funded schemes in the private sector. Table 5.10 provides estimates 
of the membership of these schemes, and these membership numbers are 
comparable with the private sector numbers in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. The figure 
of 2.6 million active members in private sector occupational DB schemes in 
Table 5.2 is consistent with the 2.57 million in Table 5.11. The figure in Table 
5.1 showing occupational pensions membership in all schemes is slightly higher 
than the figure in Table 5.11 and this is presumably due to members who are in 
occupational DC schemes and smaller DB schemes outside of the PPF-eligible 
universe.
Table 5.0: Membership of PPF-eligible DB universe (7,400 private sector 
schemes at 3 March 2009)
Source: PPF/The Pensions Regulator (2009) Purple Book, Table 3.5
The Purple Book also includes data on the funding status of these DB schemes, 
and these data are updated on a monthly basis. Table 5.11 shows the funding 
status of the PPF-eligible DB universe at 10 June 2010. The funding status shows 
the extent to which a pension fund’s assets are greater (surplus) or less (deficit) 
than the promised DB pension liabilities. There were 2,233 schemes in surplus 
(34 per cent) and 4,420 in deficit (66 per cent) at 10 June 2010. The total deficit 
of these funds in deficit was £81 billion.
Table 5.: PPF-eligible DB funding statistics at 0 June 200
Where Funding ratio=Balance/((Assets+Liabilities)/2)
Source: PPF 7800 Website data
Type of member Number of members
Active members 2.57
Pensioners 5.33
Deferred members 4.47
Total 12.37
Number of 
schemes
Percent 
of total
Assets 
(£billion)
Liabilities 
(£billion)
Balance 
(£billion)
Funding ratio 
(%)
Aggregate 6,643 901.5 923.3 -21.8 -2.39%
Deficit schemes 4,420 66% 469.2 550.2 -81.0 -15.89%
Surplus schemes 2,233 34% 432.3 373.1 59.2 14.69%
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For the 34 per cent of schemes in surplus, we assume they will need to sell 
assets when retiring pensioners access their funds. Our estimates from Table 
5.9, suggest that between £1.1 billion and £1.8 billion worth of funded DB assets 
will be liquidated in this way (calculated as 34 per cent of £3.3 billion or £5.5 
billion, respectively), representing between 0.3 per cent and 0.5 per cent of 
the private sector’s DB pension fund liabilities for those schemes in surplus. For 
those schemes in deficit, calculation of the CETV suggests that the pensioner 
withdrawing funds will be expected to bear part of the deficit. So that although 
the present value of the retiring cohort’s pension liability entitlements are 
between £2.2 billion and £3.6 billion (calculated as 66 per cent of £3.3 billion 
or £5.5 billion, respectively), we predict that running down the assets will result 
in pension fund asset sales of between £1.9 billion and £3 billion (calculated as 
84 per cent of £2.2 billion or £3.6 billion, respectively, given the funding ratio of 
-16 per cent for deficit funds). 
Impact of change in compulsory annuitisation on public sector funded schemes
The major funded public sector pension scheme is, as mentioned above, the 
Local Government Pension Scheme (LGPS). The Audit Commission (2010) 
recently analysed the affordability, fairness and financial health of this scheme 
for England. Figure 2 in that report suggests that as at end-March 2010, assets 
cover about three-quarters of the pension liabilities in LGPS. Table 5.9 indicates 
that between £2.1 billion and £3.5 billion of pension liabilities in the public 
sector funded DB schemes could be accessed by the annual retiring cohort. In 
the case of the LGPS, in part this could be met by running down assets, but since 
the scheme is only 75 per cent funded, then the calculation of the CETV would 
suggest that the retiring scheme members would have to bear part of this deficit. 
We predict that the retiring cohort would be able to access between £1.6 billion 
and £2.6 billion of the claims on their pension fund which would be met by 
running down the LGPS’s scheme assets. 
Impact of change in compulsory annuitisation on public sector  
unfunded schemes
Table 5.9 indicates that there are around 3.8 million active members of 
unfunded public sector DB pension schemes, and this represents around 42% of 
the funds that could be accessed at retirement by the retiring cohort, and would 
add between £4.8 billion and £7.9 billion to the public sector deficit on 
an annual basis, if these implicit fund values were realised. 
Summary
We suggest that the proposal to abolish the annuitisation requirement for DC 
pension schemes will have an effect on the DB pensions market, either through 
DB members demanding similar rights under their scheme or through pension 
transfers. We suggest that if the same rules on annuitisation above a Minimum 
Income Requirement in the DC market are applied to the DB market, between 
£10.2 billion and £16.7 billion of DB pension fund assets may be accessed each 
year by the retiring cohort. We suggest that if the Government does not intend 
its proposals on the relaxation of annuity rules for DC pensions to apply to DB 
pensions, it will need to legislate to prevent this.
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6. Impact of the proposal on long-term government  
bond markets
According to the DMO (2004: ¶ 6), the UK Government’s debt management 
policy objective is:
“to minimize over the long term, the costs of meeting the Government’s  
financing needs, taking into account risk, whilst ensuring that debt management  
policy is consistent with the aims of monetary policy.” 
It achieves this objective and arrives at its issuance plans each year by taking 
into account: (i) the Government appetite for risk (both nominal and real in 
each year); (ii) cash management requirement for Treasury bills and other short 
term debt instruments; (iii) the shape of the yield curves (nominal and real) 
and the expected effect of issuance policy; and (iv) investors’ demand for gilts. 
Figure 6.1 shows the size of the gilts market over time, and the split between 
conventional and index-linked bonds: index-linked bonds have continued to 
increase as a proportion of gilts issued since they were first issued in 1981. The 
total outstanding size of the gilts market in 2010 was approaching one-trillion 
sterling.
Figure 6.: Size of the outstanding UK gilts market by bond-type
Source: DMO
Following calls from the pensions industry during 2004 for more and longer-
dated debt, the DMO (2004) consulted with participants in the pensions 
industry. The consultation paper noted (¶ 11) that according to ONS data, 
pension funds and insurance companies were already the largest group of 
holders of gilts (64%) and their demand (¶ 8) reflected the UK Government’s 
issuance of longer maturity bonds relative to other major governments.
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The 2004 consultation paper recognised that the demand from pension funds 
for long-term bonds would increase in the future because of demographic trends, 
closer matching of assets and liabilities (i.e., switching from equities to bonds in 
pension fund portfolios) and “the likelihood that a shift from defined benefit to 
defined contribution schemes will increase demand for annuities” (¶ 11).
As a consequence of the consultation, a new 50-year maturity conventional gilt 
was issued in May 2005 and a new 40-year conventional gilt followed in May 
2006. The first 50-year index-linked gilt was issued in September 2005.
Figure 6.2: UK gilts market composition over time
Source: DMO
Figure 6.2 shows the changing composition of the Government’s gilt issuance 
with the increasing emphasis on longer-term gilts: the percentage of index-linked 
and conventional bonds above 15 years’ maturity has increased from less than 
30 per cent in 1990-91 to nearly 50 per cent in 2009-10. Figure 6.3 shows a 
more detailed breakdown of the composition of gilts in 2010. This figure again 
emphasises the increasing importance of ultra-long gilts (both conventional and 
index linked) which comprise 15 per cent of the total amount of gilts outstanding 
of £963 billion.
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Figure 6.3: Composition of gilts in issue in 200 (£ million nominal)
Source: DMO
Annuity providers use a combination of existing long-, medium- and short-term 
government bonds, as well as other financial instruments including swaps and 
other derivatives, to immunize their portfolio of annuity liabilities against interest-
rate risk.
Figure 6.4: Type of debt instruments held by insurance companies
Source: FSA Insurance Returns 
Figure 6.3 shows that the mixture of government bonds (approved) and 
corporate bonds (other) held by insurance companies has shifted over time: in 
1985, life insurance companies held five times as many government bonds by 
value as corporate bonds; by 2005 this ratio was almost unity. The effect of 
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abolishing compulsory annuitisation would be that on an annual basis life-
insurance companies and pension funds would reduce their demand for long-
term gilts, because of the contraction in the pensions annuity market discussed 
in Section 4 and the possible effects on the DB pensions market discussed in 
Section 5. 
Life insurance companies and pension funds would sell off their holdings of 
long-term gilts, depressing gilt prices at the longer end and hence increasing 
yields. From our estimates in Table 4.5, we predicted that the existing annuity 
market would shrink by between £1 billion and £2.2 billion. The information in 
Figure 6.4 suggests that half of these funds are held in approved fixed-interest 
securities, so that insurance companies would sell off between £0.5 billion and 
£1 billion of gilts annually. This represents around 0.5% of the outstanding stock 
of ultra-long conventional and index-linked gilts.
Figure 6.5 shows the asset allocation of DB pension funds over almost fifty 
years, and we can see that by 2009, 31% of pension fund assets were held in 
UK fixed-interest securities (government and corporate bonds) and index-linked 
securities.
Figure 6.5: Asset allocation of average pension fund, 962-2009
Source: UBS Pension Fund Indicators (2010)
From our estimates in Table 5.8, we predict that if the abolition of the 
annuitisation requirement were applied to occupational DB plans, then between 
£10.2 billion and £16.7 billion could be accessed annually by the retiring cohort 
if they wanted to access flexible drawdown above the MIR. Using the information 
in Figure 6.5, this implies that pension funds will annually liquidate between 
£3.2 billion and £5.2 billion of long-term government debt.  
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Individual pensioners would be unlikely to buy these long-term gilts, since the 
flexibility that these pensioners desire would probably be satisfied by a move into 
domestic and international equities. 
The increase in yields at the long end in response to this sell off may also 
have an effect on yields at the shorter end, making it more expensive for the 
Government to issue debt at all maturities.
Summary
We argue that the proposal to abolish the annuitisation requirement will have 
an effect on the government bond market. If the retiring cohort of pensioners 
access their DC lump sums, we predict insurance companies will no longer need 
to hold government bonds in the same quantity to back their annuity products 
and would become net sellers of between £0.5 billion and £1.2 billion of gilts 
annually. Similarly, if DB pensioners also access the lump sum equivalent of their 
pensions at retirement, DB pension funds will liquidate between £3.2 billion 
and £5.2 billion of long-term government debt annually. This liquidation of 
government debt will occur at a time when the Government is attempting to fund 
a huge budget deficit by issuing bonds.
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7. The optimal decumulation investment strategy and the 
cognitive problems that elderly people can face when dealing 
with investments
The consultation paper (¶ 2.14) suggests that capped drawdown will be 
available to all pensioners without any need to satisfy a MIR. However, in 
practice this is unlikely to be a suitable choice for most people. As FSA rules 
recognise, drawdown products are risky, and are only suitable for relatively 
wealthy individuals.6 A number of studies have shown that the optimal 
decumulation investment strategy (i.e., the strategy to optimally run down in 
retirement the assets that have been accumulated during the working life) is 
highly complex (e.g., Blake et al. (2003), Blake (2003), Gerrard et al. (2004), 
Cairns et al. (2006) and Blake et al. (2009)). It will depend on factors such as 
anticipated investment returns, attitude to risk, life expectancy, health status 
and the desire to make bequests. The optimal strategy might not involve the 
immediate purchase of an annuity, especially if risk aversion is low or the 
desire to make a bequest is high. In this case, the optimal strategy is income 
drawdown. However, there will come a time when the implicit return on an 
annuity exceeds the return on financial investments such as equities7 and then it 
becomes optimal to annuitise remaining wealth. This typically occurs around the 
age of 80 for males. Another optimal strategy is to annuitise gradually. Although 
the studies cited here consider optimal investment strategies at high ages, they 
do not take into account the cognitive problems that elderly people can face 
when dealing with investments. 
There have been a number of examples of mis-selling in the financial services 
industry in recent times. Two important examples have involved mortgage 
endowments and pensions mis-selling (Financial Services Authority, 2000, 
2002).8 The scale of the pensions mis-selling was enormous: “Offers (in relation 
to pensions mis-selling between 1988-1994) have been made to over one 
million consumers amounting to nearly £9 billion” (Financial Services Authority, 
2002). The FSA took disciplinary action against 345 firms which involved fines 
totalling £9,507,250. The pensions mis-selling did not end in 1994. As late as 
2008, the FSA was forced to announce “The FSA is taking action to improve 
the quality of advice given to customers to switch into a personal pension or 
self-invested personal pension (SIPP), following a review which found variable 
standards across a sample of 30 firms” (Financial Services Authority press 
release, 5 December 2008). This followed an FSA review which found that 16 
per cent of 500 transfers into a new SIPP were based on poor advice.   
A key point about the above mis-selling cases is that the people involved were 
still in work and many of them were relatively young. They could, therefore, 
have been expected to be relatively financially aware of the implications of the 
	
	 	
16 The FSA MoneyMadeClear Guidelines on Income Withdrawal (January 2009) and the latest FSA guide to pension annuities and 
pension fund withdrawal emphasises that “Income withdrawal plans are complex and not suitable for everyone, for example if you have 
a small pension fund and no other assets or income to fall back on” (April, 2010). Earlier versions of the FSA guides to pension annuities 
recommended that “Income withdrawal involves extra costs and extra investment risk compared with buying an annuity straight away. For 
this reason, it is usually suitable only if you have a pension fund of over £100,000 (after taking any lump sum) or you have other assets 
and sources of income to fall back on” (January, 2004).
17 The technical condition is when the mortality drag exceeds the equity premium (Milevsky (1998)). The mortality drag is the proportion 
of people of a given age who die during the year.
18 The personal pensions mis-selling scandal took place between 29 April 1988 and 30 June 1994. Individuals who would have been 
financially better off at retirement in their employer’s pension scheme were advised to leave their employer’s scheme and transfer their 
pension benefits to a personal pension plan instead.
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decisions they were being persuaded to take. But clearly this was not the case. 
An FSA (2006) survey of financial capability found that in a financial literacy 
quiz, the under-40’s performed worse than their elders, but that the over-70s 
performed worst of all age groups. The problem is compounded when it involves 
elderly people who are unable to return to work in order to rectify the financial 
consequences of any mistakes they make. 
A recent US study has examined the effect that cognitive impairment has on 
financial decision making. The susceptibility to dementia doubles every five 
years after age 60. Agarwal et al. (2009) discovered that around 50 per cent 
of people in their 80s experienced significant cognitive impairment (including 
dementia) and this prevented them from making sensible financial decisions. 
Older adults also show a marked decline in “numeracy”, the quantitative 
skill necessary to understand the meaning of numerical information such as 
percentages and probabilities. This meant that older people had considerable 
difficulty with comprehending even simple measures of risk. For example, 
when invited to say which of the following involved the greatest risk of getting a 
disease, 1 in 10, 1 in 100 or 1 in 1000, 29 per cent of a sample of 65-94 year-
olds gave an incorrect answer (Peters, 2008).
As an illustration of the confusion that people can face when making annuity 
decisions, consider the US framing study of Brown et al. (2008). The study 
involved 1300 people over the age of 50 who were asked to select between one 
of two choices designed to have the same actuarial value:
1. an annuity paying $650 a month for life
2. a savings account containing $100,000 and paying 4 per cent interest. 
Half the sample of participants in the study were offered the two options in 
a “consumption” frame where the annuity was explained as a vehicle for 
providing a secure income of $650 a month for life. Around 70 per cent of 
this subsample chose the annuity. The other half were offered the two choices 
in an “investment” frame where the annuity was explained as an investment 
generating a return of $650 a month. Just 21 per cent of the second subsample 
chose the annuity. This is because the annuity now appeared to be a risky 
investment since it would be lost if the individual died early: the option of having 
the $100,000 “invested” in the savings account was now interpreted as a much 
safer investment even though the savings account will not hedge an individual’s 
longevity risk.
A key problem with the Government’s proposal is that it changes the frame 
through which a pension scheme will be viewed and assessed. The main 
purpose of a pension scheme is to provide, for however long the pensioner lives, 
consumption in retirement sufficient to avoid a dramatic fall in living standards 
compared with when the pensioner was in work. The appropriate frame for 
viewing a pension scheme is therefore the “consumption” frame. After the 
implementation of the Government’s proposal, a pension scheme will be viewed 
through an “investment” frame which will make the purchase of an annuity not 
only appear risky, but also very unfair to the pensioner’s family who will now be 
denied their “right” to inherit the pension fund when the pensioner dies. 
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This is very well illustrated in a recent newspaper9 article entitled “Can my wife 
inherit my pension if I die?” The newspaper interviewed a 57-year-old self-
invested personal pension scheme member who is “delighted that he will no 
longer be forced to buy an annuity when he turns 75. … He plans to take out 
an income drawdown plan when he retires at 66, as he dislikes annuities. He 
says: ‘I hate the idea of my money going to an insurance company instead of 
my kids. I am opting for income drawdown because I want the flexibility and 
control of my money…. The new rules mean we can pass our remaining pension 
straight to our children, even if they have to pay a 55 per cent tax charge.’ ” This 
illustrates that merely re-framing the presentation of the annuitisation decision 
can change behaviour.
Summary
Optimal decumulation investment strategies can be highly complex and 
need to take into account anticipated investment returns, attitude to risk, life 
expectancy, health status and the desire to make bequests. Further, the optimal 
strategies are not static and involve complex choices about, say, the optimal 
timing of annuity purchases. However, these strategies typically fail to take into 
account the cognitive problems that elderly people can face when dealing with 
investments. The proposed change to the pensions annuity market represents 
a shift from a “consumption frame” to an “investment frame”. We report that, 
whether as a result of cognitive impairment or an inappropriate framing of 
choices, many older adults will find it difficult to make sensible decisions about 
how to invest and spend their retirement savings. The Government could soon 
find itself embroiled in another mis-selling scandal and this time involving 
vulnerable elderly people.
19  By James Coney. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/money/article-1296335/Pension-reforms-Can-wife-inherit-pension-I-die.html.  
Accessed 20 July 2010.
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8. Inheritance and savings decisions
Our discussion so far has concentrated on the consequences of removing the 
compulsory annuitisation requirement for pension wealth and for means-tested 
benefits. In this section, we consider two other questions: first, will wealth which 
is not annuitised be used for bequests; second, how might the change in policy 
affect the savings decisions of people who are not close to retirement? One of 
the reasons for the proposal is to encourage people to save more throughout 
their lifetime. For example, the “Introduction” to the consultation document 
states that “the current inflexibility in the pensions tax rules acts as a barrier to 
saving for some because people have very little choice in securing a retirement 
income and finding a solution that is best for them”. In our discussion, we take 
account of the alternative tax-efficient savings vehicle (an ISA, with an annual 
limit of £10,200) which is more flexible than a pension as it is possible to access 
the funds before retirement.
We shall see that the benefits of the new policy depend largely on whether 
someone is a higher-rate or basic-rate taxpayer while in employment. In both 
cases, there is already an incentive to save in a pension fund because tax relief 
on contributions tends to be higher than the tax paid on income received from 
a pension.20 In this section, we concentrate on the additional incentives to save 
other than those that exist already.
The consultation document states that “the Government does not intend 
pensions to become a vehicle for the accumulation of capital sums for the 
purposes of inheritance. The Government will therefore ensure that the tax 
rate on unused funds remaining on death does not leave open incentives for 
pension saving to be used to reduce inheritance tax liabilities. The Government 
will monitor this closely and will take further action if there is evidence of such 
activity” (¶2.2).
Under current rules, there are penal tax rates (up to 82 per cent) on wealth 
which has not been annuitised by the age of 75 (i.e, for pensioners who choose 
the option of alternatively secured pension or ASP).2 The proposed policy is 
that any unused funds payable on the death of a pensioner will be taxed at 
55 per cent. A recovery charge of 55 per cent means that the Government 
approximately re-claims the tax privileges given to a higher-rate tax payer in 
the accumulation of the pension fund. This is because 25 per cent of the fund 
can be taken as a tax-free lump sum: the 41 per cent tax relief given to the 
entire pension fund must now be reclaimed from the remaining 75 per cent and 
0.41/0.75 = 54.7 per cent.22 
Consider a higher-rate taxpayer who wishes to invest money which is then left as 
a bequest. The two simplest savings vehicles are the pension fund and an ISA. 
	
20 In 2009-10, there were 3.1 million higher-rate taxpayers of whom 1.9 million had incomes less than £50,000 (Inland Revenue 
Statistics, 2010). Anyone with an income of £50,000 in employment is likely to have a pension of less than £43,875 and thus have a 
lower marginal tax rate on retirement, although these thresholds will change considerably over time. Basic-rate tax payers receive tax 
relief on NI contributions (11 per cent), but do not pay NI contributions on pension income.
21 An apparent anomaly is that if a pensioner dies before the age of 75 without accessing the pension fund at all, then the entire fund is 
free of both a recovery charge or inheritance tax: the consultation suggests that this policy will continue. Relatively poor pensioners in bad 
health who face steep withdrawal rates of means-tested benefits might then have an incentive not to take a pension but to pass on their 
fund. But the sums of money would be very small. Very rich pensioners with sufficient funds that they did not need to access their pension 
wealth would be a different matter, although such people are more likely to live beyond 75.
22 The situation is complicated by some higher-rate taxpayers having a 50 per cent tax band. The 41 per cent assumes 40 per cent 
income tax and 1 per cent National Insurance contributions.
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Assuming the same pre-tax rate of return can be earned on both, the pension 
fund and the ISA are now perfect substitutes, since the investment returns are not 
taxed in either case and the additional tax relief on contributions to the pension 
fund are matched by the recovery charge. However, the pension fund has three 
additional advantages: first, it is accompanied by the 25 per cent tax-free lump 
sum; second, it is not liable to inheritance tax; third, the annual limit on the ISA 
is only £10,200. While not all higher-rate income tax payers will be liable for 
inheritance tax, many will be and the new policy is likely to be faced with this 
problem.
The consultation document suggests that this issue will be closely monitored, so 
that further action can be taken.23 It is difficult to see how this will be monitored, 
except by analysing the sums of money which escape taxation in this way. Since 
this information will only be available when people die, which will be some 
considerable time in the future, an expectation to this entitlement will have 
accumulated and it may prove politically difficult to reverse.
The situation is different for basic-rate taxpayers. Most basic rate taxpayers will 
also be paying NI contributions of 11 per cent, so the effective rate of tax relief 
on pension contributions for these people will be 31 per cent. This suggests that 
the fairer recovery charge for such people should be 0.31/0.75 = 41 per cent, 
so a recovery charge of 55 per cent will be a penalty rate for them.
Table 8.: Average post-tax cumulative return on pension wealth left as a 
bequest for a basic-rate taxpayer
Source: Own calculations
Table 8.1 shows the effect of the recovery charge on any pension fund which 
remains on the death of a pensioner and which is passed on as a bequest. In 
all cases, we assume that there is no inheritance tax and that the investment 
earns 7 per cent gross per year. Money invested in an ISA receives 7 per cent 
and that outside an ISA is taxed at 20 per cent and has a net return of 5.6 per 
cent. Money in a personal pension receives tax relief of 31 per cent and pays 
a recovery charge of 55 per cent. Since basic-rate taxpayers are unlikely to 
exhaust their ISA limit of £10,200 per year, then it can be seen that the recovery 
charge is sufficiently high that there would be no incentive to try to use the 
pension fund for inheritance purposes relative to the ISA.24
Number of years 
money is invested
Personal 
pension
ISA account Simple investment account
5 3.6 7 5.6
10 5.3 7 5.6
15 5.9 7 5.6
20 6.1 7 5.6
25 6.3 7 5.6
30 6.4 7 5.6
35 6.5 7 5.6
40 6.6 7 5.6
23  The wording used in the consultation is almost identical to that of the previous Government’s Paymaster General, Dawn Primarolo, 
(Hansard 21 Mar 2005 : Column 40WS) with reference to alternatively secured pension being used as a tax avoidance measure. That 
policy was reversed about a year later.
24  With short time horizons, using a pension scheme to avoid inheritance tax would be less efficient than a non-tax advantaged 
investment account.
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A consequence of this is that the policy might appear to benefit higher-rate 
taxpayers considerably more than basic-rate taxpayers. There are a considerable 
number of basic-rate taxpayers whose income is sufficiently high that not all of 
their pensions savings will be needed to meet the MIR.25 These people may feel 
it to be unfair that they are penalised for bequeathing their additional pension 
wealth to heirs when higher-rate tax payers appear not to be.
Summary
Allowing pensioners to avoid annuitisation will make it possible for pension  
fund wealth to be used to escape inheritance tax. The consultation proposes  
a 55 per cent recovery charge. Since this merely cancels the tax relief on  
pension contributions of a higher rate taxpayer, such a charge may be 
insufficient to prevent higher-rate tax payers using pension wealth for inheritance 
tax planning which may result in a loss of tax revenues. However, the 55 per  
cent recovery charge would be penal for basic rate taxpayers.  Differential 
treatment in this way may be perceived as unfair and result in political pressure 
for further changes.
25  There are currently 26.7 million basic-rate tax payers with income above £30,000, although many of these are not in employment.
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9. Policy recommendations 
In this section we explicitly respond to the consultation questions which are listed 
in summary form on page 21 of the consultation document. The consultation 
requested views on the following points below. As our report makes clear, 
however, some of the most important consequences of the policy are not 
considered by these questions.
A.  The level of an appropriate annual drawdown limit for capped 
drawdown. 
Since the objective must be to avoid running out of pension assets before death, 
the annual drawdown limit should equal the annuitisation value of residual 
pension wealth (Blake et al. (2003)). The amount will rise from one year to the 
next if the equity premium exceeds that year’s survival credit or mortality drag 
and fall otherwise. 
A.2  Its intended approach to reforming the pensions tax framework, in line 
with its commitment to end the effective requirement to purchase an 
annuity at age 75. 
See analysis in Section 8 above.
A.3  What income should be considered ‘secure’ for the purposes of the MIR 
and whether proposals for the life annuity income that can be considered 
for the MIR are practical and appropriate.
The consultation document proposes that the MIR should be indexed by LPI. We 
do not view this as entirely appropriate since annuity income will grow more 
slowly than limits for means-tested benefits and benefit entitlement will inevitably 
grow over time. However, without considerable financial innovation, it is 
impossible to provide alternative annuity products which would resolve this issue.
It is appropriate that employment income should not be counted as secure 
income to meet the MIR because pensioners’ earned income will only be 
significant early in retirement. We believe that it would be difficult to frame 
appropriate rules for the MIR that allowed pensioners to access their pension 
wealth while continuing to work.
A.4  What an appropriate level for the MIR should be and how the MIR should 
be adjusted for different ages. 
The immediate need for any MIR is that it is set at a high level to minimise 
entitlement to Pension and Guarantee Credits. Using two different methods 
of projecting wages and inflation, we calculate that the MIR for a 65-year-old 
individual should be £14,100 (including the BSP) and for a couple (male aged 
65, female aged 63) should be £20,000 (including BSP) in 2010 and then grow 
in line with the LPI.  If a pension unit secures the MIR at a later age then the MIR 
applying should be the MIR in force for the year in which income is secured.
Tables would have to be produced showing the MIR appropriate for each age 
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in a given year. For reasons of space, we have not reported calculations of the 
appropriate MIR for someone aged other than 65 who annuitises in 2010. 
However, to adequately protect the public purse, any MIR also needs to take 
account of entitlement to other means-tested benefits and to people’s actual 
expenditure requirements throughout retirement (both in absolute and relative 
terms) and, in particular, the impact of declining health on expenditure needs. 
A.5 Whether a different MIR should be set for individuals and couples. 
We suggest that the MIR should be different for individuals and for couples.  
We suggest that the MIR for a couple should be in the form of a life annuity with 
a reversion to the survivor. The level should commence at £20,000 (including 
the BSP) in 2010 for a 65-year old man with a wife aged 63, with a reversion to 
an income for the survivor of £14,100 in 2010, both figures updated in line with 
the LPI.
It is a moot point whether there should be one table of MIR values for couples 
based just on the age of the man or whether it should be based on the ages 
of both partners. The former has the merit of simplicity but is based on a 
model of family formation which is likely to be increasingly outdated. It may 
prove necessary to produce multiple sets of tables, including tables for civil 
partnerships where both partners are of the same gender.
A.6 How often the MIR level should be reviewed. 
The current approach taken to calculate the Basic State Pension and other 
pension entitlements is to have a single value which applies to all pensioners 
regardless of age (i.e., different generations are treated the same). We have 
assumed here that the MIR will be treated in the same way. In the long run, this 
will be unsustainable since the BSP will be growing faster than the MIR, but this 
will be a political decision. The uncertainty in projecting the path of the MIR 
and the BSP is sufficiently low in the short term that these reviews could be at 
relatively infrequent intervals (e.g., every five years).
A.7  How to minimise unnecessary burdens for individuals and industry in the 
assessment of the MIR. 
A major simplification will be to have one MIR in a given year which will apply 
to pensioners of all ages. However, such a rule will involve other inconsistencies 
which we have discussed above. The other major concern is how to frame 
a simple rule for how much income should be secured under the MIR when 
pensioners continue in employment, since it is essential that pensioners have 
incentives to carry on working.
A.8  Whether other legislative or regulatory barriers remain whose removal 
would enable industry to provide consumers with more attractive 
products without incurring fiscal or avoidance risks. 
No comment.
A.9  How the industry, Government and advice bodies such as CFEB can 
work to ensure that individuals make appropriate choices about what 
to do with their retirement savings in the absence of the requirement to 
purchase an annuity by age 75. 
These bodies need to recognise three things: (i) the importance of good default 
decumulation strategies (i.e., those that attempt to replicate optimal decision 
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making), (ii) the general ineffectiveness of financial education in improving 
outcomes26 and (ii) the cognitive problems that elderly people can face when 
dealing with investments.
A.0  Whether the proposed reforms have unintended consequences  
that may affect the market’s ability to supply annuities at attractive rates 
or prevent the annuity market being able to meet likely demand for 
annuities. 
If the requirement to annuitise at age 75 above a MIR is abolished, we estimate 
that the compulsory purchase annuity market will shrink from its current value 
of £11 billion per annum to around £9 billion per annum. Further, the value of 
DC pension funds that could be accessed as a lump sum or drawdown product 
would be between £1 billion and £2 billion per annum.
We speculate that the proposal to abolish the annuitisation requirement for DC 
pension schemes will have an effect on the DB pensions market, either through 
lobbying or through pension transfers. 
We suggest that if the same rules on annuitisation above a Minimum Income 
Requirement in the DC market are applied to the DB market, between £10.2 
billion and £16.7 billion of DB pension fund assets may be accessed each year 
by the retiring cohort. We suggest that if the Government does not intend its 
proposals on the relaxation of annuity rules for DC pensions to apply to DB 
pensions, it may need to legislate to prevent this.
Our analysis suggests that the proposal to abolish the annuitisation requirement 
will have an effect on the government bond market. If the retiring cohort of 
pensioners accesses their DC lump sums, we predict insurance companies will 
no longer need to hold government bonds in the same quantity to back their 
annuity products and would become net sellers of between £0.5 billion and 
£1.2 billion of gilts annually. Similarly if DB pensioners also access the lump 
sum equivalent of their pensions at retirement, DB pension funds will liquidate 
between £3.2 billion and £5.2 billion of long-term government debt annually. 
This liquidation of government debt will occur at a time when the Government is 
attempting to fund a huge budget deficit by issuing bonds.
26  As Professor David Laibson of Harvard University has stated “Education no substitute for good default” (Pioneer Investment’s 
European Colloquia 2007).
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0. Conclusion
The proposals contained in HM Treasury’s consultation document ‘Removing 
the requirement to annuitise by age 75’ released on 15 July 2010 will have, 
if implemented, a radical effect on pension provision in this country. We 
have examined the potential effects of this policy and some unintended 
consequences. We have identified a worst-case scenario, in relation to the 
impact on the existing annuity market, the impact of DB pensions and the effect 
on the government bond market. Perhaps large numbers of people will not wish 
to access their pension funds, but the temptation to dip into a large pool of cash 
may prove irresistible.
A good pension scheme has a two-fold purpose: (i) it provides consumption 
security in retirement for however long the scheme member lives and (ii) it allows 
the scheme member to enjoy a similar standard of living in retirement as they 
enjoyed prior to retirement. 
The consultation document’s proposals will change the frame through which 
pensions are viewed. Pensions will be viewed not through a “consumption 
frame” – which is how everyone views the Basic State Pension, for example – but 
rather through an “investment frame”. People will begin to see not a stream of 
future pension payments, but instead will see a “pension pot“, the present value 
of this stream of future pension payments. And, given human nature as well as 
their general poor understanding of longevity risk, people would rather like to 
be able to invest and spend their pension pot as they see fit. The consultation 
document’s proposals encourage this view. They also encourage the view that it 
will be acceptable to live just above the breadline in retirement: having secured 
the MIR, it won’t really matter how poorly the remaining pension pot is invested. 
We should also emphasise that the objective of the MIR that we have calculated 
is to avoid a pensioner falling back on means-tested benefits (and we have only 
considered Pension Credit). The consultation document (e.g., ¶3.14) recognises 
that pensioners’ needs will vary throughout retirement due to long-term care 
and health costs. Our MIR does not take account of such costs or changing 
circumstances. It is likely that some pensioners will find the MIR unacceptably low 
for some situations: the only way to avoid this would be to set the MIR at a much 
higher level.
The important message for policymakers from this report is that in practice the 
MIR may need to be greater because of the state’s liability for other means-tested 
benefits, and because there is no guarantee that current Pension Credit levels will 
meet pensioners’ income and expenditure needs throughout retirement.
 
Pension schemes are going to look increasingly like tax avoidance schemes 
for the well off. While the poor will still be required to annuitise, the rich will 
be given the flexibility to spend their tax-favoured pension pot as they wish, 
including bequeathing their unused funds to their children without any liability to 
inheritance tax.
Finally, the Government’s proposals are likely to lead to an increase in the 
variability of outcomes for pensioners. As a consequence of this: (i) there is the 
risk of increasing long-term political pressure from the retired population for a 
larger share of the national cake and (ii) there is the risk of increased poverty 
among pensioners who make poor decisions with their wealth.
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Appendix
Summary of HM Treasury’s consultation document ‘Removing the 
requirement to annuitise by age 75’ published on 15 July 2010
•  The consultation recognises that for many an annuity will always remain the 
best product
•  However the Government wishes to introduce greater flexibility in how 
people can take income to reflect the changing pensions and workplace 
environment, to encourage more pension saving and to encourage product 
innovation. 
•  The age 75 rules on annuitisation, value protection lump sums, tax free cash 
and trivial commutation lump sums will be removed.
•  The age 75 rules on contributions and Lifetime Allowance checks will 
remain.
•  Pension funds will be able to remain in a USP ("capped drawdown") 
indefinitely. ASPs will cease to exist.
•  The USP maximum withdrawal limit may be reviewed. The current 120 per 
cent is probably too high at older ages and may have to be less than 100 
per cent to avoid the risk of people exhausting their funds.
• There will be no minimum withdrawal requirement.
• Any withdrawals will be taxed as income.
•  A USP customer will be able to access additional flexibility (in effect 
the permanent removal of the upper withdrawal limit) through "flexible 
drawdown" provided they have secured a minimum income (the Minimum 
Income Requirement). This minimum income will need to be a secure 
pension income for life and escalate by the lower of 2.5 per cent or 
inflation.
•  The customer would then be able to withdraw up to 100 per cent of the 
remainder of their fund. This will be taxed as income.
• The minimum income required is not set out in the consultation paper.
•  However they expect it to take account of not just current means-tested 
benefits, but also potential health costs and future expenditure needs.
• Restrictions on value-protection annuities will be removed.
•  Lump sum death benefits will be taxed at 55 per cent to counteract tax relief 
given - this includes value-protection payments.
•  The only exception is pension saving where no part has been used for an 
income when the saver dies before 75 where the pot will be tax free.
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Statement by Prudential UK & Europe
Established in 1848, Prudential remains one of the country’s best known 
financial institutions, and one of the UK’s leading providers of pension, savings 
and retirement income products. With over 7 million customers in the UK we are 
well placed to understand the issues that people face, and to help in developing 
solutions to current and future challenges. 
We are pleased to sponsor the publication of this second report from the 
Pensions Institute on the impact of removing the ‘age 75 rule’. We believe this 
report is an important contribution to the debate on retirement income reform 
and provides valuable insight for policymakers as they consider their next steps.  
People approaching or in retirement experience many opportunities but also 
face many risks. For society the impact of an ageing population represents an 
unprecedented challenge to existing social, political and fiscal arrangements. 
Creating a pensions and retirement income regime that supports and sustains 
individuals and society in this environment is a challenge that demands 
earnest attention.  We are keen to play our part in creating such a regime, and 
supporting this report is a contribution towards that. 
Prudential UK & Europe
September 2010
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About the Pensions Institute
The objectives of the Pensions Institute (www.pensions-institute.org) are to 
undertake high quality research in all fields related to pensions, to communicate 
the results of that research to the academic and practitioner community, to 
establish an international network of pensions researchers from a variety of 
disciplines, and to provide expert independent advice to the pensions industry 
and government.
We take a fully multidisciplinary approach. For the first time disciplines such as 
economics, finance, insurance, and actuarial science through to accounting, 
corporate governance, law and regulation have been brought together in order 
to enhance strategic thinking, research and teaching in pensions.
As the first and only UK academic research centre focused entirely on pensions, 
the Pensions Institute unites some of the world’s leading experts in these fields  
in order to offer an integrated approach to the complex problems that arise in 
this field.
Objectives
The Pensions Institute undertakes research in a wide range of fields, including:
Pension Microeconomics
The economics of individual and corporate pension planning, long-term savings 
and retirement decisions.
Pension Fund Management and Performance
The investment management and investment performance of occupational and 
personal pension schemes.
Pension Funding and Valuations
The actuarial and insurance issues related to pension schemes, including risk 
management, asset-liability management, funding, scheme design, annuities, 
and guarantees.
Pension Law and Regulation
The legal aspects of pension schemes and pension fund management.
Pension Accounting, Taxation and Administration
The operational aspects of running pension schemes.
Marketing
The practice and ethics of selling group and individual pension products.
Macroeconomics of Pensions
The implications of aggregate pension savings and the impact of the size and 
maturity of pension funds on other sectors of the economy (e.g., corporate, 
public and international sectors).
Public Policy
Domestic and EU social policy towards pension provision and other employee 
benefits in the light of factors such as the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty 
and the demographic developments in Europe and other countries.
Research disseminated by the Pensions Institute may include views on policy but the Pensions 
Institute itself takes no institutional policy positions.
